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ANCIENT AND MODERN CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS¹

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THE belief in miracles has played a very important part in all the great historical religions. In primitive religions the intervention of powers supposed to be beyond ordinary human control and acting for purposes of their own did not assume the character of supernatural events, for natural and supernatural were not two distinct categories in the primitive religious experience of mankind. It was the process of moralization of religions and the growing knowledge of the consistent working of natural laws that gradually led to a classification of phenomena into the two great divisions of those which were natural and those above nature, a distinction that very soon became an opposition and gave rise to that dualistic conception of life and of the universe which we find at the basis of all the great historical religions.

Religions then became ways of salvation, systems of doctrine and of practice through which evil, suffering, and death could be overcome. All these religions claimed a divine origin; their teaching had come from heaven through the agency of inspired men, their religious rituals and ceremonies had been adopted at the bidding of a deity who often had shown the way to salvation and immortality by himself passing through a process of death and resurrection.

In those religions, miracles, that is to say, extraordinary events caused by the direct intervention of a deity and in departure from the usual course of nature, assumed a rôle of primary importance. Upon miracles devolved the task of providing satisfactory evidence for the divine character and truth

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of each religion; miracles justified its claim to be revealed wisdom, miracles impressed upon ritual and mysterious ceremony the seal of a divine institution; miracles filled the heart of the faithful with hope and smote with fear the unfaithful and unbelieving. Myths and mythologies, gods of cities and gods of nations, mystery cults and state religions, vied with one another in claiming superior miraculous power in order to make stronger their appeal to the faith of the masses.

We are accustomed to read in our books of history that the age of greatest faith in the whole of human history was the Christian Middle Ages, the period in which faith made of the church the greatest power on earth, crowded Europe with monasteries and convents, inspired the crusaders, built the great gothic cathedrals, and burned the heretics at the stake. But in fact, it seems to me, the age of Graeco-Roman civilization was one of even greater faith than the Christian Middle Ages. For in the Middle Ages a unified system of ecclesiastical and social organization forced the individual to fall in line with other men in his religious faith and hope. In the Graeco-Roman world, on the contrary, coexistent rival religions strove to attract devotees by boasting the power of their several deities, each promising miraculous intervention by which might be attained health and prosperity in this life and immortal happiness in the life beyond; and thus there was left to the individual a freedom of choice which called for a stronger faith and a deeper confidence in the efficacy of religion.

Though man is supposed to be, by definition, a being endowed with the distinctive characteristic of reason, it is amazing to see what a small part, after all, reason has played in the course of human history in comparison with such other motive forces as faith, feelings, passions, and instincts. The more one reviews the pages which unfold the history of human events and institutions, the more he feels that the primary purpose of reason has been not to lead, not to throw light on the path to be chosen and determine the choice, but rather to follow, and then to try to justify by the hard work of logical considerations and sequences the choice already made by other leading motives. Especially in the field of religious history do we find

that reason has been confined mostly to the humble task of patching together bits and fragments of beliefs and traditions, principles and experiences, all kinds of odds and ends, and combining them in a frame which to the happy believer could give at least the impression of a consistent unity. It is not to their theologies that the great historical religions owe their beginning and existence. Faith built them up with its appeal to the human mind and heart: theology came afterwards to justify and systematize them as well as it could in the given conditions. Theology has been a great force for the preservation of religious traditions and institutions, but it has not been, and is not, the effective power behind religion.

This explains why on the one hand theology has been the most conservative among sciences, and on the other why its undeniable attractions have no appeal for the many and win but a small circle of devotees, usually from the ranks of those whose profession and life is closely connected with religious organization and ecclesiastical institutions. This also explains another feature of the theological world, namely, that among the various branches of theology the weakest, and therefore most difficult to handle successfully, is apologetics.

No theology has ever been left to enjoy its triumphs in peace: the history of every theology in all religions, ancient and modern, is a painful succession of daily tribulations, of endless attacks and counter-attacks, of strategic retreats and costly compromises. Long before trench warfare was invented and practised by military strategists it had been the favorite method of theological conflict. No wonder that theologians have gained for themselves the reputation of a fighting race, and that among their intellectual weapons those of defence against unbelievers and dissenters have been the object of peculiar solicitude lest they grow rusty and useless.

The science of apologetics, though its classification as a distinct discipline in the theological curriculum is a rather modern device, is as old as religion itself, and its history is an integral and essential part of the history of all religions. Especially is this true of Christianity, a religion whose history we can follow through twenty centuries, and the one that we cherish and love

because it is so vital a part of our own civilization as well as of our own individual life and spiritual experience.

Born within Judaism and transplanted into the Graeco-Roman world, Christianity found the field well crowded with religions of salvation centred about a great variety of myths of death and resurrection. The similarity to these of the Christian system of salvation, and on the other hand the peculiar characteristics which it derived from Judaism, namely, its monotheism and its eschatology, enabled Christianity to gather together the most impressive elements of the religious thought and practice of the contemporary world.

To the masses it offered all the advantages of a practical way of salvation through faith and sacramental practices, both of which, apart from Christianity, the masses had come to cherish. Moreover, it emphasized an aspect of religious life which was either missing or at least left unimportant in the other mystery religions. It held to the close dependence of the value of external observances upon the internal disposition of the soul, and the principle that purity of heart and sincerity of intention are an essential part of religious saving experience. As long as Christianity remained a religion of the lower classes the task of its apologetics was simple. In other religions of salvation the whole system hinged upon mythical gods whose personality was lost in the clouds of poetic lore and whose experience of a tragic death and a saving resurrection was the object of wild theological exegesis. Christianity, on the contrary, could boast against its rivals an historical personality who had lived and suffered death at the hand of the Romans. There were witnesses, who had seen him with their own eyes, who had lived with him, who had gathered his actual words and teachings, who had beheld his miracles, and finally had seen him risen from the dead and returning to heaven. Early Christianity was under no necessity to give a demonstration of the possibility of miracles or of the possibility of the coming to earth of a divine being in human form, to teach and to secure salvation through death and resurrection. All this was taken for granted; it was upon such beliefs that the religions which had the largest following stood and prospered. All that Chris-

tianity needed in order to gain room for itself was to present its own story as superior to the ancient myths, taking advantage of the historical elements which it possessed, and above all to put the greatest possible emphasis on its high ethical teachings with their humanitarian and social implications and upon the eschatological elements with their urgent appeal for an unpostponable *metanoia* in view of the imminent catastrophic end of the existing social and political order. The Synoptic Gospels and several of the so-called apocryphal gospels, which mix historical episodes with the most astounding miracles and at the same time present lofty moral teaching and an impressive appeal to repentance and spiritual rebirth, were the first, and were successful, books of Christian apologetics. They compared favorably with the mythical and often immoral tales of the divine heroes of the mystery cults, and the miracles and extraordinary events that marked the life of Jesus and his apostles were not of a kind to arouse doubts or protests among people who were fed on the tales of the gods and the shrines of the heathen world. Stories of intercourse between human and divine beings, of virgin births, of healing of diseases, of dead called back to life, and the like, were the common store to which all religions were fain to resort for material to enrich their history and their traditions.

But soon Christianity, compelled by its growth and by the exigencies of the environment, undertook the task of conquering the intellectual classes and therefore of clothing itself with the mantle of philosophy. The problem of apologetics then became fraught with difficulties and danger. A philosophical eclecticism and a practical materialism were, indeed, predominant among the higher social classes of the Graeco-Roman world: but men, no matter where and when they live or to what social class they belong, are creatures of their own time, and submit to the influence of their environment and of current ideas and formulas, just as they accommodate themselves to the well established political and social institutions of their land and caste. In a world in which faith and supernatural influences were breathed in with the air, the intellectualism of thinkers could not fail to come to terms and to compromise with the

forma mentis of the times. After all, the high philosophical speculation represented by Platonic or Stoic metaphysics required at many a point a strong disposition to faith on the part of their adepts; no wonder, therefore, that philosophy also, following the religious pattern, was often led to take recourse to mythical elements and attribute to the real or supposed originators of theories and systems a divine or semi-divine connection, and thus to bestow upon their teaching the character of a revelation no less venerable and sacred than religious revelation. A typical example of this tendency is the revival of Pythagoreanism in the first century of our era, with its wealth of legends and miracles concerning the remote founder. Closely connected with this idea of a primitive philosophical revelation was the veneration and high respect toward what was called ancient wisdom; for the more a system of either religious tradition or philosophical synthesis could be assigned to a remote and mythical past, the nearer it was thought to be to the source, and consequently the more authentic its teaching, especially if clothed in mysterious formulae and unintelligible phraseology.

Through the adoption of a logos-doctrine accommodated to christology by the bridge already built by Philo, the Christian system of salvation sailed upon the high sea of philosophical speculation, where it was bound to meet the troubled waves of gnosticism and successive later storms, to emerge with a new and heavy ballast of doctrinal and practical conflicting tendencies that took several centuries before they were sorted and finally harmonized in a compact system of Christian theology. It was in this period also, that Christian apologetics were shaped into a form which remained the classical panoply from which for centuries traditional Christianity borrowed most of its weapons of defence down to our own times.

According to this system of apologetics, the Christian revelation was as old as the world itself: it was therefore much older than the vaunted ancient revelations of Egyptians and Greeks. This revelation was contained in the Jewish sacred books, in which the promises made by God to Israel and the prophets' utterances were to be interpreted as referring to the specific Christian revelation, which had fulfilled those promises and

prophecies. Thus the fact of Christian origin in Jewish environment together with Paul's theological view of the relations between the law and the new dispensation came to play an important part in Christian apologetics in the promotion of Christianity's claim to be the most ancient wisdom. But those Christian apologists, such as Justin Martyr, who had even a smattering of philosophical culture, could not themselves believe, and were still less able to declare to those whom they tried to win, that there was no truth and no intellectual or moral value in the whole teaching of heathen philosophers. More generous than certain modern fundamentalists who refuse to see any good in the opinions and tenets of their opponents and do not hesitate to accuse them of insincerity and a corrupt heart, the ancient apologists of Christianity not only bowed before the majesty of ancient philosophy, borrowing from it much more than a mere terminology, but even admitted a philosophical revelation by which God had saved the heathen world from being entirely overcome by error and intellectual darkness. As for the convincing evidence that the Christian revelation was the complement and perfection of both the Jewish and the philosophical revelation, the apologists fell upon the two great external arguments commonly accepted, the one from prophecy and miracles, the other (still more striking, if not more convincing to contemporaries) of the moral superiority of Christianity. The purity, simplicity, and humanitarian touch of Christian ethics, so charmingly conspicuous in the moral teaching of the gospels and in keeping with the best Jewish ethical tradition, reappears in the apologists with detailed comparisons between the Christian system and the explicit or implicit moral teaching of heathen religions and with references to the highest moral traditions of philosophy such as those embodied in Stoic ethics. The lofty moral standards of the Christian rule of life were the *cheval de bataille*, the stronghold of apologetics available both for refuting the base calumnies of orgies and debauchery in the Christian assemblies, which were in circulation among the people and were believed even by many in the higher social ranks, and for convincing the civil power, whose hostility and persecution menaced the very existence of the Christian reli-

gion, that the Christians not merely were a harmless and innocent people, but were the most pious, virtuous, and devoted subjects of imperial Rome.

In the following period, especially after Christianity was granted recognition and gradually became the state religion, the philosophical elaboration of Christian doctrine went on rapidly, although it had to undergo a long period of internal conflicts and endless struggles. A theological system in which the elements of revelation were more or less forcibly welded with philosophical speculation upon platonic or neo-platonic lines, was the result. From the point of view of apologetics the most important development during the patristic period was that concerning the relation between faith and reason.

This problem had only slightly attracted the attention of the early apologists in the period when Christianity did not yet claim to be a philosophy. But under the pressure of the gnostic waves it came to the surface, and was the object of interesting speculation especially on the part of the great Alexandrian theologians Clement and Origen. Tertullian with his African fondness for paradoxes inverted the problem in his famous utterance: *Credo quia absurdum!* But even in his apologetic works, and much more in the writings of the Alexandrian theologians, we already find the elements on which was built the classical solution of the problem, such as it remained in Christian theology up to the great scholastic re-elaboration of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. According to the anthropological notions of the early Fathers, derived mainly from Platonic sources and in harmony with their broad and loose conception of divine revelation, man possesses certain general notions about truth and error, good and evil, not acquired through process of reason, but inborn in him. This is the *testimonium conscientiae* mentioned by Tertullian, and to this interior witness, this inner light, he alluded in his famous phrase, *anima est naturaliter christiana*. But if the starting-point, the point of concentration, and the point of arrival of our whole intellectual and spiritual life is this interior light, which, unless obstacles are raised against it by the corrupt flesh, is equally diffused in and equally active upon all our intellectual and

moral energies, if this is granted, then faith and reason cannot be two different categories, much less two contradictory categories, but rather two successive and even intermingled stages of the same process of self-expanding light and truth. This was what Clement of Alexandria meant when he attempted to establish the equation $\gamma\nu\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma-\pi\iota\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$. The doctrine of the illumination of the soul, as it came to be called by this theory, or of an immanent inner light which enables man to accept equally the *credibilia rationis* and the *incredibilia fidei* and to grasp the essential harmony of these in a mystic act of overwhelming love, became a classic doctrine in Christian theology, especially under the influence of Augustine. Augustine's anthropology, however, was very different from that of his predecessors: its extreme pessimism concerning man's nature and capacity of merit could not well fit with the conception of an interior light as a primitive and essential endowment of human nature itself. In his system the interior light became an actual divine grace freely granted, and in this form the doctrine remained in Western theological tradition. The system of apologetics was thus enriched by this addition of an internal evidence. The well-known prologue of Augustine's Confessions in which the bereaved soul's longing for peace and rest finds at last its intellectual as well as moral repose in the knowledge and the love of God, was the source of inspiration for many a page of apologetic Christian literature. But after all, the main and supposedly most substantial arguments of apologetics were always those of the old tradition, the argument from prophecy and miracles and the moral argument. That greatest of all apologetic books of the patristic age, the City of God, which in its gigantic frame embraces nature and the spirit, the religious and the political society, heaven and earth, the past, the present, and the future, is based on these two cornerstones upon which the divine design which unfolds itself in nature and history rests.

Then followed a long slumber, during which, with few exceptions, most of the theological work that was done was but to collect passages from the Fathers and to solve all questions on the basis of their authority. The place of apologetics was mainly taken by books of saints' miracles and monks' lives in

which the whole legendary lore of old tales and popular romances was worked over by the imagination and simple faith of the mediaeval peoples. In the Eastern church the whole apologetic activity centred around the special problems created by the unconquerable Monophysite theology and later by the bloody Iconoclastic controversy. The theological synthesis of John of Damascus, the last book of apologetics and last feeble voice of the Greek patristic tradition, was but a recast of Aristotelian logic and of the old platonizing theology.

In the West, apart from the dreamer John Scotus, the busy theologians of the Carolingian renaissance revived ancient quarrels about predestination, and elaborated a new realistic interpretation of the eucharistic presence. A new period began in the late eleventh century with the revival of dialectics; but only in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries did the rediscovery and study of Aristotelian philosophy in the West bring gradually a fundamental change in the outlook and method of sciences and especially of theology. In the theological systematization of Aquinas the old Platonic idealism of the Augustinian tradition was superseded by an intellectualistic theology, enclosed in a rigid dialectic frame and representing the supreme effort of all time to bring reason and dogma together into a logical harmony and consistent unity. The new apologetics followed the same path. Beginning with the problem of the existence of God, which was solved by appealing not to the ontological proof of Anselm, but to the dialectic principles of causality and finality, and advancing through the whole series of dogmas and doctrines taught by the church, Aquinas built up a monumental synthesis of theology in which, from the first link to the last, an unbroken continuity of logical premises and inferences connects all articles of faith and all ecclesiastical doctrines and institutions. He thus gave to the whole process the apparent advantage of being built upon strong, consistent, and trustworthy rational foundations.

Reason and faith belong to two distinct but not opposite realms; coming from the same source of light, God, they are not and cannot be in opposition. Natural knowledge covers a large field; it reaches not only the phenomena and the laws of the

universe, but also the ultimate causes of that universe and the working of the laws of the spirit. The human soul, its faculties and its eternal destiny, God's existence and attributes, are thus primarily the object of knowledge by reason, although for religious and moral convenience they are included also in the articles of faith. Reason gives also conclusive evidence about the necessity, the possibility, and the actual reality of revelation; and its usefulness goes still further in the realm of faith. This realm covers directly the whole dogmatic system, and indirectly bestows the sanction of a divine law upon the system of institutions, through which the charismatic power entrusted by God to the church flows over the soul and kindles the spiritual fire on earth. But revelation, even in regard to those highest and most sacred mysteries which in their essence are beyond understanding, is not irrational. 'Above reason' does not mean 'against reason': to go beyond logic is not to be illogical. Since there is not, and cannot be, contradiction between faith and reason, all apparently rational objections, either in logic or metaphysics, which have been raised or can be raised, on no matter what ground, against Christian dogma and religion can and must be answered in such a way as to disclose the logical fallacy which inevitably must reside in them. Thus reason, besides giving direct demonstration of those truths which are objects of rational knowledge, also, by refuting all objections against faith and dogma, provides an indirect logical demonstration of the fundamentally rational character of revelation.

Aquinas' *Summa contra gentiles* was and to a great extent still is the classical book of apologetics of the Catholic Church and of all theologies which remain faithful to the mediaeval conception of revelation. In a strictly intellectualistic system there is no room for an immanent light or immanent grace as source and channel of knowledge such as we have found in the Platonic-Augustinian theology of the former period. Truth is the result of an equation of the external reality to be known and of the knowing subject, the intellect, *aequatio rei et intellectus*; philosophy is the knowledge of things by their ultimate causes; theology is the science of God, which, flowing as it does from the divine intellect, effects a certainty higher than any merely logi-

cal one. The argument, however, from the testimony of conscience brought from the thirst of the soul which finds its satisfaction only in God did not disappear from the new apologetics; it was only relegated to a corner as a subsidiary argument, having in itself no logical cogency but only a degree of moral weight. On the contrary, the two traditional arguments from prophecy and miracles and from the superiority of Christian ethics kept their place of primary importance among the grounds of credibility of Christian faith, side by side with the rational evidence derived from the philosophical and theological systematization of knowledge and revelation.

The theologians of the Protestant Reformation, who did away with so much of the old theology and made a clean sweep of institutional ecclesiasticism, did not introduce any noteworthy modification into the mediaeval apologetic system in regard to these fundamental positions of religious thought, but their emphasis upon faith and Scripture, and their implicit disparagement of reason as a factor in a theological synthesis, which they derived from scholastic nominalism, and their full confidence in the anthropology of Augustine, which they adopted and developed to its extreme consequences, contained some of the germs of a further development destined vitally to affect the whole system of Christian apologetics.

Emerging from the period of bitter controversies with Catholic theology and from the endless struggles between conflicting doctrinal formulations of the various branches of the reformed church, Protestant apologetics, during the following centuries, availing itself of the great freedom now granted to doctrinal speculations, has followed more or less closely the new philosophical currents and the new scientific methods introduced into all branches of human knowledge. Catholic apologetics, on the contrary, strictly bound to the defence of definite and unchangeable dogmatic and historical positions, although it has again and again attempted to rejuvenate its method, has not undergone, and can hardly undergo, any substantial change without jeopardizing its orthodoxy. In Protestantism itself we must distinguish, at least in a general way, between so-called conservative and liberal theology. The apologists of the former,

clinging still to the fundamental conceptions of external historical revelation as objective reality, to scriptural infallibility, to atonement by the death of the Son of God, to sin and grace, and to other connected points, are but the continuators of the ancient system of apologetics. In liberal theology, however, a subjective and dynamic conception of revelation has prevailed, giving rise to a variety of apologetic attempts, according to the conceptions of different individuals and schools concerning either the essence of religion and its general content or specifically the essence of Christianity and the value of its historical development.

The history of the new apologetics begins with the English theologians of the eighteenth century who valiantly strove to stem the rising tide of philosophical deism. The deistic philosophers, by their empirical theory of knowledge and by completely isolating God the creator from any further contact with the world, eliminated and destroyed the very conception of supernaturalism and celebrated the beauty of so-called natural religion. The work which represents best the anti-deistic apologetics of this period is the well-known book of Bishop Butler, *The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed*, to which his *Sermons on Human Nature* must be added. Butler's method, with its twofold division — evidences of natural religion and evidences of revealed religion external as well as internal, became the model of all apologetic treatises for many generations. Through an analogical and comparative survey of the content of revelation and of the facts of experimental order and also an examination of the postulates of the human conscience, Butler aimed to prove that natural religion alone is unable to explain and solve many of the fundamental problems both intellectual and moral raised by philosophy and by experience; while if to natural religion we add also revealed religion, we are able to reach solutions which have at least a higher degree of probability and which carry conviction.

Obviously the apologetics represented by Butler, Paley, and many others who followed, starts from the premises and moves within the circle of the old intellectualistic theology; but in many points it disengaged itself from the traditional positions,

as for instance in claiming not absolute certainty but only a higher degree of probability for the solutions reached by the aid of revelation, in giving a place of importance to the evidence from fitness, or, as we should say, to pragmatic evidence, and, last but not least, in assigning a preponderant value to moral as against logical evidence. In this way English apologetics was the prelude to the coming changes in liberal theology.

The turning point in the history of modern apologetics is marked by the theological revolution initiated by Schleiermacher and the rise of the new philosophy with Kant. The former, by claiming that the source and centre of religion is to be found in the depths of human consciousness and specifically in the consciousness of our absolute dependence upon God, severed the vital connection of religious apologetics with dialectical processes and with either theoretical or practical moral processes. Kant, on the other hand, by his demonstration of the radical incapacity of our theoretical faculties to formulate any religious philosophy and by shifting the genesis of religion to the immanent postulates of the moral conscience, sapped the very foundations of the intellectualistic tradition. These two divergent movements, the pragmatic-theological system of Schleiermacher with his psychological apologetics and the ethico-rational system of Kant with his critical interpretation, have continued to develop to our own days, on paths now different and now convergent, but the two have left no room in liberal theology for the old apologetics with its rational evidence, its miracles and prophecies, and its assumed uniqueness of the Christian religion. By the shifting of the centre of apologetics from intellectual evidence to experience, the problem became no longer that of finding the harmony between faith and reason, but rather that of tracing the connection of the fundamental content of revelation, conceived not as objective, static, and external truth, but as a vital principle within the Christian consciousness, with both doctrinal formulations and institutions in which during the centuries of its existence Christianity has embodied the results of its spiritual experience. But at this point new factors came into play. The scientific theory of evolution entered to upset altogether the old theories

concerning the laws of life. This was the beginning of a revolution which not only gradually changed the outlook upon biological and physiological processes but conquered the whole realm of science and was applied to all human activities, psychology and history, the whole physical and spiritual world, all social, political, and religious institutions. As a result of the principle of evolution as applied to religion a new branch of science came gradually to the foreground and has now, to the great annoyance of traditional theologians, taken a conspicuous place in the ranks of knowledge: the science and history of religions. Using to the utmost all the resources of anthropology and ethnology, of archaeology and history, of psychology and sociology, and of the whole of the scientific progress and methods of our times, this new science has drawn a more or less accurate picture of the natural history of religions, tracing the development and growth from the earliest elementary forms to the most complex organizations, from magic to holy sacraments, from shamanism to the most exalted priesthood, from dreams to historical revelation, from the instinctive surmise of helpful or dangerous powers to the most sublime theodicy, from tribal to national, and from national to universal religions.

This natural history of religions shows that with unbroken continuity religion is a normal and natural development which presents no unexplainable mysteries. The various religions, viewed each in this historical setting, show different characteristics, but at the same time they all present themselves with much in common, and above all, they are seen to have gone through analogous processes of growth and decay; their doctrines and practices have been connected with and developed from older beliefs and ceremonials, and in turn have given rise to new theologies and new cults; they have influenced one another and borrowed to a large extent from one another; last but not least, in their various stages all of them have been in some degree the mirror which reflected the extent of moral, cultural, social, and political progress reached by each people in the course of its history. As seen in this picture, Christianity, no matter how exalted and how advanced its teaching or its standards, is, like all other religions, the product of the same

natural factors and of the same historical process, presents the same phenomena, and is bound by the same natural limitations and laws.

The problem of Christian apologetics has become a very difficult one: how to graft into this natural history of religions the supernatural element and the supernatural origin claimed for itself by the Christian system, to the exclusion of other religions. To escape from the dangerous admission of the relative value of all religious experience, which would be fatal to the claimed uniqueness of Christianity, it was necessary to present evidence that at a certain point in the natural evolution of religion, at a fixed date in history, a new vital principle came into the process to cause the re-elaboration and transformation of the preëxistent elements of religion into the new spiritual experience of Christianity which finally brought together man and God in a system of relationship that fulfils and satisfies all the needs of the individual and social religious consciousness. In other words, all this made it necessary to pay renewed attention to the historical problem of the origins of the Christian revelation and of the Christian church.

On this field the old apologetics met with a new and terrible disaster. Biblical and historical criticism had long been at work in a searching analysis of the sacred books and of the historical traditions of Christianity; but only in the nineteenth century had the improvement in the use of scientific tools made it possible to subject the whole question of Christian origins to a radical revision and to weigh by trustworthy methods the documentary value of the writings which contain the divine revelation accepted by Christianity and of the records of its early doctrinal and institutional development. The results of philological and historical analysis left little doubt that the sacred books in both method of composition and content were much like the sacred books of many other religions. Internal and external evidence made it clear that many of these books proceeded neither from the inspired authors to whom they were attributed nor from the periods in which they were supposed to have been written. Duplications and interpolations, contamination of sources and forgeries, legendary elements borrowed from

elsewhere and historical errors, all the usual characteristics and literary devices commonly found in all ancient religious literatures were found present in no less degree in the books of the Old and the New Testament. The theological doctrine of biblical inspiration which had put these books in a class by themselves underwent a rapid change, from "verbal inspiration" to "thought inspiration" and from "thought inspiration" to a vague "moral inspiration," such as could be attributed to many a book of ancient philosophy or poetry. At the same time historical criticism came forward with no less startling discoveries. The religion of Israel was originally but a rude polytheism which developed slowly by way of a tribal henotheism and a moral monotheism into the final conception of a universal theological monotheism, inherited by Christianity. Even more striking were the conclusions as to the history of Christian origins. The Christian system of salvation, far from being the creation of Jesus himself, was the result of the fusion of Jewish and gentile religious elements in the form of a cult externally not much different from many others of the Graeco-Roman world. The Christian doctrinal system, far from being contained already complete (even in germ) in the primitive Christian revelation, is the result of a long evolution; the stages of this can be traced throughout its history, and at various times and from various sources elements and factors come into play that had no connection whatever with the original content and purpose of the Christian message. Ecclesiastical institutions appear to have been the product of successive accommodations to circumstances and environment and to have been largely borrowed, not only from other religions but also from the social and political institutions of various periods and countries.

All this tragic philosophical and historical housecleaning left traditional Christian apologetics bare of its last garments. The only escape from the shifting ground, encumbered with the ruins of ancient strongholds, was by turning to the fundamental elements and essential principles of Christianity, or in other words to the problem of the essence of Christianity. A central nucleus marked by the divine seal was sought which should single out Christianity as the true religion, a central unique

revelation around which throughout the centuries of Christian history the whole system of Christian piety has gathered, producing doctrinal and institutional forms that represent the changing and relative experiences of the Christian consciousness of numberless generations.

In reality, however, the search for the so-called essence of Christianity, although in spite of the complexity of the Christian historical development it may appear historically possible, must perhaps be termed a logical absurdity if in the last analysis its elements have to be looked for in individual religious experience. It was therefore inevitable that on the one hand the problem of the essence of Christianity should be absorbed in the more general problem of the essence of religion, and on the other that a solution could be found only by turning to psychological and moral grounds and reducing the essence of Christianity to such elementary factors as the fatherhood of God and the moral value of the soteric experience of Jesus. The famous book of von Harnack, *The Essence of Christianity*, was the gospel of this new apologetics, and at the time of its publication appeared to be the last word that could be said on this tormenting problem. And yet, after only twenty years, that book is almost forgotten.

A reaction against this radicalism was inevitable, and it came in a double form. Some theologians went back to fundamentally old positions, but justified them by the application of theological principles and methods that represent a cross between a diluted fideism and a concentrated historicism; others took a further step towards a more radical radicalism that denies even the logical validity of the premises of the whole conception of apologetics.

The former tendency is represented in general by the attempt of the so-called Barthian theology, and especially by its later exponents, such as Br  nner, with whom Calvinistic theology clothes itself in the garments of modern philosophical and historical terminology. This theology, if it be not irreverent to make the comparison, resembles the political theory and practice of certain European countries in which a revival of ancient forms of despotic government is at least apparently harmon-

ized with the modern conception of the all-absorbing State. So Calvin's sovereignty of God is brought back, but harmonized, at least apparently, with a view of the nature of religion which, in spite of its ostensible fondness for dialectic processes in the good old scholastic style, is nevertheless inherently anti-intellectualistic.

The second tendency is characterized by the same subtle, though still vague, revival of super-mystical aspirations which has led other German theological circles to attempt a new and deeper interpretation of the essentials of Christian piety. The well-known book of Rudolph Otto, *Das Heilige, or the Irrational in the Idea of the Divine*, represents a bold attempt to trace the source and essence of religion not to rational or sub-rational or super-rational elements but directly to irrational elements which produce what he calls divination, or irrational religious intuition — the divination or intuition of the 'sacrum' in a mysterious experience in which the soul is overcome by the 'numinous.' As a consequence there is not, and cannot be, any rational apologetics of religion. The very phrase 'rational religion' is a contradiction in terms. And in the case of Christianity, which is the highest and most perfect religion, the absurdity of such an attempt would be still greater. "If you compare the various religions," says Otto, "and ask which of them is the most perfect, we must say that it is neither by virtue of the contribution a religion has made to culture, nor by its attitude towards reason or towards humanity, nor by any of its external manifestations, that the value of each religion can be measured; but it is only what is most hidden in each of them, that is to say, the idea itself of the sacrum, and the degree in which each of them has advanced in the intuition and divination of that, which constitutes the perfection of a religion. And this deeper and most advanced intuition of the sacrum we find only in Christianity. But if you ask rational or moral evidences in support of this assumption, I must say," concludes Otto, "that there are none, because the very nature of this experience excludes both rational and moral elements. The religious conviction which is derived by the intuition of the sacrum through pure feeling is beyond all categories of rational and sub-rational

or super-rational; it is altogether irrational and is accepted only by those who experience it. To all others it is a closed book, and to argue with them, even if it were possible, would be of no use."

From the point of view of traditional theology and apologetics Otto's principles, if applied to theology, would give rise to what I would call, if again it were not irreverent, an 'anarchist theology' that would exert on traditional views the same effect as a charge of dynamite under an old and tottering building. Otto's conclusion sounds like a funeral inscription over the grave of Christian apologetics.

At the end of the long history that we have rapidly outlined, one might suppose that the Christian doctrinal and moral system, after being stripped by scientists and historians, by philosophers and unconventional theologians, of all its rational, historical, and supernatural claims, would by this time have lost its intellectual, moral, and spiritual influence in the world and be in full process of decay and disintegration. But the fact is that in spite of the *débâcle* of apologetics Christianity is still the greatest religious force in the world. The great mass of believers have little need of philosophical or historical apologetics: to the rank and file, mostly simple souls, unsophisticated by any considerable degree of theological culture, Christianity is the traditional and cherished religion of family and environment, a religion that teaches them righteousness on earth and promises eternal happiness in the life beyond.

But the situation is different when we turn to the higher classes, to ministers and priests and teachers in the church, to whom is entrusted the doctrinal tradition of the Christian faith and the great responsibility of breaking the bread of religious knowledge to those who are entrusted to their spiritual care. For them apologetics — some kind of apologetics — is necessary, first that they may convince themselves of the truth of the system for which they stand, and then to carry their conviction to others. Now if we turn and look around, what we find in contemporary Protestant Christianity is this. On the one side, we find a large crowd of teachers and ministers who stand on the same apologetic platform as their great-grandfathers and, either in good faith or wilfully, ignore all those

problems and difficulties which during the last century have changed the whole outlook of the theological sciences. They still hold fast to their Bible as verbally inspired, to their evidence from prophecy and extraordinary supernatural interventions, to their antiquated, supposedly rational, demonstrations, and cling to their denominational creeds as the best if not the unique expression of the Christian beliefs and traditions. Their faith is not immune to fanaticism; and the boldest, if not always the wisest, among them, are ever ready to roar out prophetic menaces and sometimes even vulgar abuse against whoever dares to turn a searchlight in their direction.

On the other side, there is a smaller group of ministers and teachers, whom for lack of a better word we may call liberal theologians, who in freedom from the fetters of conventional theology try through paths different, but equally steep and thorny, to gain a larger vision of religious life and a deeper comprehension of the sources of spiritual progress. All of them in some measure agree that the experience of the divine in human consciousness is the foundation of religion, but very few would be bold enough to banish altogether from it the rational element and take refuge in the irrationalism of Professor Otto. Apart from such a position, a great variety of opinions and tendencies are to be found among the 'liberals'; some, with a weakness for ecclesiastical institutions, are unwilling to part with creeds and formulas of the past, and keep them as symbols or relics even after having emptied them of all their original meaning and content. Others emphasize the social element in religion and would transform the churches into social agencies taking the lead in all kinds of economic movements and social experiments for the uplifting of the masses. Others still, led by opposite tendencies, foster a religious individualism which is in some respects a survival of the early spirit and tradition of the Reformation. And, finally, there are those who think that everything is as it ought to be and sit still, dreaming of a fair Kingdom of God above the clouds.

Between these two main groups there is in the middle the large body of those who belong neither to the right nor to the left, those who are afraid to be called conservative and still

more afraid to be grouped with the liberal wing, or to be anything definite and consistent, those whose theology is as elastic as a rubber band and can easily hold together the creed of Nicaea, the predestination of Calvin, and the experience and consciousness of Schleiermacher's theology, often without having any clear idea of their meaning and their implications. The theologians of the first group keep on brandishing the once mighty sword of the old apologetics; they form an imposing army, but its swords are rusty and mostly useless when it is obliged to face the formidable attack of modern science and historical criticism. Those of the second group form an army in which each soldier carries a different weapon, and some none at all: an agglomeration of individuals but not an army, rather a mass of individual searchers after light and truth to guide themselves and others to a better understanding of the mysteries of spiritual life. Those in the middle, who form perhaps the noisiest and busiest crowd, have no weapons of their own, but borrow them from the right or the left, according to chance or circumstance; most of the time they do not know how to handle them.

Our picture, however, would not be complete if we did not turn to look also into the closed field of the Catholic Church. At first our eyes meet there with an imposing sight; an immense and formidable army in which order, discipline, and authority are supreme. A rigid dogmatic system, a well-ordered hierarchy, a unified system of government, and an infallible pope, make of the Catholic Church a great religious, social, economical, and political power in the world. But behind the glittering display of power and vitality there is an inner spiritual weakness which is manifest with peculiar clearness in its apologetics. On this point the Catholic Church today is still the mediaeval church of Thomas Aquinas. Only one important modification, albeit a very significant one, has been introduced since St. Thomas in its system of apologetics. In the mediaeval treatises of theology the exposition and demonstration of the Christian doctrines starts from God, his unity and trinity, and then proceeds to the incarnation and to the connected sections of grace and sacraments, virtues and sins, finally reaching the *novissima*, or

last things, by which the whole theological cycle returns to God, alpha and omega of knowledge and revelation. But from the times of the Counter-reformation, on the contrary, the theological cycle in the Catholic books of theology and apologetics starts from a new chapter, 'De Ecclesia,' which in the old theology was seldom the topic of a separate and distinct section. Ecclesiology is now the starting point, the centre and dominant element, of the whole theological construction: God and man, sacraments and grace, morals and Christian hopes, all move around that central point, the Church, which absorbs everything else, for which everything was made, and to which everything is subservient. Surrounded by the bulwark of a strictly intellectualistic theology, secure in the stronghold of a legislation that leaves nothing to chance or individual initiative, and with the iron chains of discipline and the whip of a centralized autocratic infallible power, the Catholic Church shuts itself in. Catholic philosophers, historians, and men of science protest energetically when any remark is made about lack of intellectual freedom in the Catholic Church, and from their point of view they are right. For by freedom they mean what St. Augustine meant when, in the attempt to escape from the stringency of grace-determinism and to save the essential doctrine of free will, he defined *libertas* as "freedom to do good but not to do evil." In the same way the Catholic historian or man of science is free to carry on his investigations and his experiments, but only within the circle of 'doing good' represented by the iron wall of Catholic dogmatics. Unfortunately, in the world at large, by 'freedom of the will' is meant also the capability of making a mistake, the assumption of responsibility for it, and in the same way by 'freedom' of science and historical research we mean the freedom to profess and hold frankly and honestly whatever conclusions a man of science or a thinker has reached through his work conscientiously and competently done, irrespective of religious premises or confessional and denominational dogmatics.

Such a freedom does not and cannot exist in the Catholic Church, and this is by no means the ultimate reason why Catholic apologetics since the Counter-reformation has remained

practically unchanged. Strange as it may seem, there was more freedom for theological speculation during the Middle Ages, when heretics were burned at the stake, than exists today under the highly centralized system of government of the Catholic Church. Such a radical revolution in theological methodology and synthesis as that brought about by Aquinas (and his predecessors and followers), who shifted the whole system of Christian philosophy and theology from the Platonic-Augustinian voluntarism to the Aristotelian intellectualism, and who re-interpreted the whole body of Catholic dogmatics in the light of what was the new philosophy and the new science of his time, would be impossible today in the Catholic Church. Even in his own time Aquinas, in spite of the fact that he took extreme care to appear not as an innovator but as a mere continuator of theological tradition, met with strong ecclesiastical opposition and local condemnations; but today a new Aquinas who should try a new re-interpretation of dogmatics in the light of modern science, modern history, and modern philosophy would be energetically rejected, the more so the more it is thought in official Catholic circles that the synthesis and apologetics of Aquinas, the mediaeval innovator, represent the final and unchangeable word of Catholic theology.

Since the Council of Trent and the crystallization of beliefs into rigid dogmatic formulas, of which every word is sacred and unchangeable, Catholic theological speculation and theological methodology have remained at a standstill. Save for a few changes in detail, forced by new and undeniable scientific discoveries concerning the physical universe, and for the addition of several more 'objectiones,' always triumphantly refuted by a skilled syllogism or enthymeme, the treatises of Catholic theology of today show no difference whatever from those of four centuries ago. The same may be said of apologetics, and only in appearance have the apologists tried to keep abreast of the times and been anxious to meet the new conditions.

The wave of anti-aristotelianism which, under the pressure of the revival of scientific investigation and discovery, swept Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, caused also the collapse of scholastic philosophy even in Catholic cir-

cles and schools. From that time until less than half a century ago Catholic thinkers were in the unenviable position of men set to fulfil an impossible task, that of harmonizing their theology, which was scholastic and Thomistic, with a non-scholastic and anti-thomistic philosophy. Even in the Jesuit schools and colleges the text books of philosophy contained an amazing mixture of Cartesianism and intuitionism and later on even elements derived from Locke and Rousseau.

After the French Revolution the rise and expansion of German philosophy made the confusion still greater, and Catholic philosophers and theologians, divided among themselves, wandered along divergent paths which led to various systems, such as the Traditionalism of the French and Italian schools, the Hermesianism of the school of Bonn, and Möhler's Intuitionism of the school of Tübingen. The return to Scholasticism, the official adoption of it as *philosophia perennis*, under the high protection of the central authority of the church, reëstablished the balance and again soldered together Catholic theology and philosophy into a unified system. Catholic apologetics followed the same path and Aquinas' *Summa contra gentiles* became again its gospel.

But the same disintegrating forces which were at work against traditional Protestant apologetics and which invested the whole theological and historical interpretation of Christianity could not fail to be felt within the closed walls of the Catholic Church. When under Leo XIII the 'modernization' of the church seemed to have been decided upon by that ambitious pope, the insufficiency and congenital weakness of the old apologetics was strongly felt, especially in the younger circles which had come in contact with modern science and modern methods of historical research. Out of those circles sprang up what came to be called Catholic Modernism.

By freely accepting the irrefutable conclusions of biblical and historical criticism, by submitting the dogmatic tradition to a revision which, while safeguarding its spirit and its essence, should do away with all the ancient meaningless formulas and absurd terminology, and by rejuvenating ecclesiastical institutions in accordance with modern standards of religious and

political associated life, Catholic modernists hoped to do for the church of today at least in part what Aquinas had done for Christian theology in his own time. Whether and how far the Catholic modernists would have been able to carry on such an ambitious program, whether and how far they would have succeeded in harmonizing the results of destructive criticism with tradition, the new conception of the nature of religion with the essence of historical dogmatics, and how far they could have realized their plan of sapping the foundation of the Catholic institutional system and yet not destroying it, is difficult to surmise. The movement did not even reach the point of having a definite constructive program. By a subtle irony of history the wall which was raised against them by the church was the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas, and the movement was dispersed by violent disciplinary measures.

But it cannot be said that all is quiet within the sacred enclosure of Catholic thought. The pressure of modern science, modern philosophy, and modern historical method is strongly felt in several Catholic circles, and the need of a system of apologetics that does not still linger in the refutation of Sabelius and Arius, or in the controversies against the Protestants of the sixteenth century, or in rhetorical attacks against a straw man of rationalism, is advocated by Catholic writers and sincere believers.

The austere Thomists of Rome may well shut their eyes and their ears to what they call the 'vaniloquium,' the emptiness, of modern philosophy, but the need of coming to terms with it is no less real and urgent. The work was undertaken by the Neo-scholastics of Louvain, but their work, though encouraged and praised, and almost canonized under the protecting wings of Cardinal Mercier, has proved unsatisfactory to a younger and more aggressive school of Neo-scholastics, who have denounced the Louvanian synthesis as an inconsistent monstrosity and are working at their own in the Catholic University of Milan. Meanwhile Catholic apologetics, like the unfortunate knight of La Mancha, continues to fight against windmills for an, alas, unreal Dulcinea.

The obvious conclusion of this brief survey of Christian apologetics is that we have reached a turning point in its history. The old system of apologetics has lost its point; in spite of various and noteworthy improvements in its method and its spirit, it remains an antiquated weapon unfit for modern methods of defence. It must be forged anew to meet the new needs. It is not the first time in history that Christianity is confronted with such a task, but perhaps never before has the work of renovation had to be so radical and extensive, and proved so difficult, as today.

No one welcomes more than we do the results of the scientific, critical work which causes so much anxiety and embarrassment to traditional theologians. But at the same time our faith in the Christian religion is not shaken. We still think, we still believe, we still know, that Christianity contains the highest and noblest ideals of the spiritual and moral life. Whatever conception of revelation we may entertain, we recognize that the Christian religion, with its faith in a righteous and loving God whose presence we feel in our conscience and whose life mingles with ours in our inner experience, satisfies better than any other could the most essential and most vital needs of our spiritual life. On the strength of this inner experience we know that the laws of the universe, the laws of science, the world of nature, and the world of the spirit are in essential harmony and in essential unity. But we know also that this harmony and this unity are themselves the result of a process which is in everlasting motion and change. There has not been and there cannot be such a thing as a final system of theology, much less a system of apologetics which can live forever. It cannot be otherwise. In the progress of knowledge all sciences are so affected by new discoveries as to feel the need of a new synthesis, which in its turn will be superseded by another. The science of religion, thank God, is no exception.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF MARTIN BUCER TO THE REFORMATION

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IT IS a common fallacy to regard great movements in history as the work of one great prophet, to think that he alone changed the current of human events by the force of a single dynamic personality. As a matter of fact, great movements, such as the Reformation, have been produced because an unusually large number of prophets arose at the same time. Though the names of only a few have been illumined by fame, the deeds of the rest were just as necessary for the success of the movement.

Among the lesser prophets of the Reformation was Martin Bucer. Today only a few know even his name. In the first part of the sixteenth century everybody knew him as one of the most active and influential clergymen in Germany. In some of the religious and political enterprises of that day he was the chief leader, and in many other ways he made highly valuable contributions.

Bucer was born in the Alsatian city of Sélestat on November 11, 1491.¹ His father was a shoemaker, and as poor as shoemakers are traditionally reputed to be.² Yet somehow the boy was given the rudiments of an education and early in life became imbued with humanistic ideals.³ Lack of money was his chief obstacle, and it finally forced him to become a Dominican in order to continue his studies.⁴ As a member of that order he went to the University of Heidelberg.⁵ But the Dominicans were not humanists, and their insistence upon scholastic studies made Bucer's life unhappy.⁶ The situation was rendered even more unpleasant when Luther appeared at

¹ A. Erichson, *Martin Butzer*, Strasbourg, 1891, p. 1.

² *Ibid.*

³ M. Bucer, *Verantwortung*, Strasbourg, 1523, p. aiiij; J. W. Baum, *Capito und Butzer*, Elberfeld, 1860, p. 90.

⁴ Bucer, *Verantwortung*, aiiij ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*; G. Toepke, *Die Matrikel der Universität Heidelberg*, Heidelberg, 1884 ff., p. 509.

⁶ Baum, 94.

Heidelberg for the famous disputation of April, 1518, and Bucer became one of his devoted disciples.⁷ Finally he fled from the cloister,⁸ and in 1521 was granted papal dispensation from his monastic vows.⁹ Two years followed of unsettled life, and of searching for a field in which it might be possible to preach Luther's doctrines. Finally Bucer came to Strasbourg in May, 1523.¹⁰

The Reformation was well under way in the city when Bucer arrived. Already a group of gifted and energetic clergymen had gathered there, who agreed in demanding ecclesiastical changes such as Luther suggested, and they welcomed Bucer with open arms. The fact that he was married made his position at first uncertain, but soon the Council felt strong enough to defy the bishop's demand for his punishment,¹¹ and he was given a place in the ranks of the Strasbourg clergy.¹² In a few years he was generally acknowledged as their leader. Later he was made official head of the clergy by the Council,¹³ but his authority always rested more on the intrinsic value of his ideas than on the influence of his office.

As leader of the Strasbourg church Bucer made his influence felt in many ways — as preacher, pastor, teacher, author, and statesman. Of his many contributions to the development of the city, two were most important: he organized a powerful state church, and he inaugurated a vigorous educational system.

In Bucer's opinion the true belief was endangered by two groups of enemies: the conservatives, who advocated the teachings of the mediaeval church and opposed any reform, and the radicals, who to his thinking tended toward disorder, division, and heresy. The radicals he could tolerate if they kept quiet, but any active opposition from them he resisted valiantly.¹⁴

⁷ A. Horawitz and K. Hartfelder, *Briefwechsel des Beatus Rhenanus*, Leipzig, 1886, p. 106.

⁸ R. Stähelin, *Briefe aus der Reformationszeit*, Basel, 1887, p. 20.

⁹ *Thesaurus Baumianus* (a manuscript collection in the Bibliothèque universitaire et régionale de Strasbourg) I, 144; Bucer, *Verantwortung*, b,e; Stähelin, 13; Baum, 120; G. Anrich, *Martin Bucer*, Strasbourg, 1914, p. 11.

¹⁰ *Corpus Reformatorum: Ulrich Zwinglis Werke*, 1904 ff., VIII, 81.

¹¹ A. Baum, *Magistrat und Reformation in Strasbourg bis 1529*, Strasbourg, 1887, pp. 29 ff.

¹² *Ibid.* 79-80.

¹³ Anrich, 104.

¹⁴ Cf. Anrich, 36-37; C. Gerbert, *Geschichte der Strassburger Sectenbewegung zur Zeit der Reformation 1524-1534*, Strasbourg, 1889, p. x.

The conflict with the radicals led to his composing for Strasbourg several codes of belief,¹⁵ a code of discipline,¹⁶ a form of liturgy, and a catechism;¹⁷ and these formulas exerted an important influence also in other places; for example, his liturgy was modified and adopted by Calvin for use in Geneva.¹⁸

In the organization of an educational system Bucer was the leader of a large group who were interested in having good schools. He himself delivered erudite lectures on the Bible, aroused public interest, and imported teachers of exceptional ability, of whom the most renowned was John Sturm,¹⁹ famous in the annals of education. Thus was laid the foundation on which the University of Strasbourg was later erected.

But Bucer's activities in Strasbourg were only a part of his contributions to the Reformation in Germany. He was perhaps best known for his attempt to establish peace in the controversy between Lutherans and Zwinglians on the Lord's Supper. The dispute began between Luther and Carlstadt, and when Bucer heard of it he resolved to remain true to Luther and keep out of the quarrel.²⁰ Such an attitude soon proved to be impossible, and Bucer, forced to take sides, adopted the symbolical view,²¹ and presently joined Zwingli's party. Not only did he publish open polemics attacking the Lutheran view,²² but actually inserted passages of the same character in translations which he published of Luther's sermons and of a commentary by Bugenhagen.²³ He thus gained the reputation of being not merely a Zwinglian, but an unscrupulous one.

¹⁵ T. Schiess, *Briefwechsel der Brüder Ambrosius und Thomas Blaurer 1509-1568*, Freiburg i. Br. 1908 ff., I, 553; *Thesaurus Baumianus*, XII, 129-132.

¹⁶ T. W. Röhrich, *Mittheilungen aus der Geschichte der evangelischen Kirche des Elsasses*, Strasbourg, 1855, I, 187 ff.

¹⁷ A. Erichson, *Die Calvinische und die Altstrassburgische Gottesdienstordnung*, Strasbourg, 1894, pp. 12, 29; J. M. Reu, *Quellen zur Geschichte des kirchlichen Unterrichts*, Gütersloh, 1904, I, part I, 23, 67, 90.

¹⁸ Erichson, 7-9.

¹⁹ C. Schmidt, *La Vie et les Travaux de Jean Sturm*, Strasbourg, 1855, p. 32.

²⁰ *Thesaurus Baumianus*, II, 213.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² F. Mentz, *Bibliographische Zusammenstellung der gedruckten Schriften Butzer's*, Strasbourg, 1891, nos. 12, 14, 20.

²³ H. Eells, 'The Genesis of Martin Bucer's Doctrine of the Lord's Supper,' *Princeton Theological Review*, XXIV, 232 ff.

In 1528 a change took place in Bucer's attitude toward the whole subject.²⁴ He had always deprecated the strife; now he discovered that fundamentally Luther and Zwingli were in agreement. They fought only because each expressed his doctrine in different words, in order to exclude different errors, because of different doctrine. If only a formula could be found which would express the fundamental agreement and clear away the misunderstandings, the quarrel might be ended. This opinion was confirmed in his mind by the Colloquy of Marburg in 1529,²⁵ in spite of the failure of the conference, and at the Diet of Augsburg, in 1530, he began negotiations between the two parties with a view to an understanding.²⁶

Bucer's own doctrine of the Supper at that time was concerned chiefly with the manner of Christ's presence, the mode of the union of Christ with the elements, and the value of the sacrament. First, he believed that the true body and blood of Christ are present in the Supper.²⁷ By 'true' he meant that the bread and wine are not empty symbols,²⁸ nor all that is present, but that Christ comes down from heaven,²⁹ and as the bread is eaten by the mouth so his body is eaten by the spirit.³⁰ Christ does not become food for the stomach,³¹ he cannot be perceived by the senses,³² nor is there any mixture of his body with the elements;³³ nevertheless in the Lord's Supper two things are offered, an earthly and a heavenly,³⁴ and are received by all believers, whether worthy or not.³⁵ This was what Bucer meant by the 'true presence,' and in this sense he was willing to use and interpret the terms 'essentially,' 'really,' 'bodily,' 'naturally,' and 'substantially,' used by the Lutherans.³⁶ The bread, he said, is not really the body of the Lord, but the Lord is really in the bread.³⁷

Secondly, he explained the relation of the elements and Christ in the Supper as a 'sacramental union.'³⁸ This phrase he used

²⁴ Ibid. 242 ff.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ *Corpus Reformatorum: Melancthonis Opera*, 1854 ff., II, 109.

²⁷ M. Bucer, *Scripta Anglicana*, Basel, 1577, p. 613.

²⁸ Ibid. 642

²⁹ Ibid. 611.

³⁰ Ibid. 621

³¹ Ibid. 636.

³² Ibid. 617

³³ Ibid. 637.

³⁴ Ibid. 639.

³⁵ Ibid. 666.

³⁶ Ibid. 640.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid. 614.

to indicate that in the sacrament resides an element of mystery³⁹ beyond human explanation or understanding.⁴⁰ Consequently the best way to state it is in scriptural and patristic language.⁴¹

Thirdly, the value of the sacrament consists, he thought, in that it confirms the remission of the recipient's sins and helps him to lead a religious life.⁴² In the acts of administration and the external action of the Supper there is no value,⁴³ and it is useless to keep the elements after the ceremony.⁴⁴

The task of concord was not an easy one because Luther demanded two things: that his opponents subscribe to his doctrine and also make express admission of error. Bucer knew that they would never consent to these demands and proposed the composition of a new formula to which both sides should subscribe. Luther regarded this as impossible, but declared himself ready to give the plan a trial and to consider any such statement which Bucer might get the Zwinglians to accept.⁴⁵ Bucer tried. He made long journeys, composed delicate articles couched in language adapted to offend nobody, and called conferences at which he explained the fundamental agreement, as he saw it, between both parties. Often he became discouraged. There were so many prejudices to overcome, so many intricate puzzles of theological dogmatism to solve, that at times he even relinquished the undertaking. But always some new outbreak of the strife aroused him to the horror of a divided Protestantism, and made him return to put his hand to the plough.

Finally, with the help of influential noblemen and magistrates Luther was induced to call a conference of representatives from both parties.⁴⁶ It met at Wittenberg in May, 1536. Luther made two demands of the Zwinglians, each aimed at testing the sincerity of their statement that they agreed with him. First, they must publish a retraction of their errors; secondly, they must concede that unbelievers receive the body

³⁹ Ibid. 703.⁴⁰ Ibid. 704.⁴¹ Ibid. 617.⁴² Ibid. 701.⁴³ Ibid. 643, 674, 660.⁴⁴ Ibid. 665.⁴⁵ H. Virck, O. Winckelmann, and J. Bernays, *Politische Correspondenz der Stadt Strassburg im Zeitalter der Reformation*, Strasbourg, 1882 ff., I, 504, 512 ff.⁴⁶ E. L. Enders, *Dr. Martin Luther's Briefwechsel*, Kalw and Stuttgart, 1884 ff., X, 237-238.

and blood of Christ.⁴⁷ The result was a compromise known as the Concord of Wittenberg. In this document Bucer and his party made a distinction between the 'unworthy' and unbelievers. They conceded that the 'unworthy' receive Christ to their condemnation, but still insisted that unbelievers receive nothing but bread and wine. This meant that the presence of Christ depends on faith, not on physical action. As for the retraction of errors, Bucer threw himself into the breach and offered to publish a personal disavowal of any errors he had held. At the same time he stated that his errors had been only in the expression of his views.⁴⁸ With this Luther was satisfied, recognized them as brothers in the Lord, and partook of the communion with them.

The value of the Wittenberg Concord has always been a subject of disagreement among historians. Evidently it did not settle the dispute. Both sides believed just what they had before. It did, however, go far toward hushing the noise of strife.⁴⁹ It also divided the Zwinglian party. One part, centring in Zürich, refused to accept the Concord and even reacted to an extreme view more strict than that which Zwingli himself advocated. The other, strongest in Southwestern Germany, was reconciled with Luther, and the way was prepared for the establishment of strong Lutheranism in that area. For Bucer personally his efforts for concord had two results. He adopted a new policy of suppressing all discussion of the question, even of new formulas of concord. He believed that complete agreement was impossible, that all that could be done had been achieved, and that further tampering with the problem would only be playing with fire. As he realized, his reputation had suffered severely from playing the part of a peacemaker.⁵⁰ He was regarded as a man who was willing to sacrifice his convictions for political ends, stoop to deceptive methods, and desert

⁴⁷ Bucer, *Scripta Anglicana*, 649-651; J. G. Walch, *Dr. Martin Luthers Sämmtliche Schriften*, St. Louis, 1901, XVII, 2093.

⁴⁸ Bucer, *Scripta Anglicana*, 653; Walch, XVII, 2095-2097, 2110.

⁴⁹ Schiess, II, 88.

⁵⁰ E. Arbenz and H. Wartmann, *Die Vadianische Briefsammlung der Stadtbibliothek St. Gallen (Mittheilungen zur vaterländischen Geschichte)*, VII, 75-78; *Original Letters Relative to the English Reformation*, Cambridge, 1846, II, 524-525.

his party. At the same time a large number of influential men found in him a champion of their conviction that dogmatic strife had been carried too far. They never took the name of Bucerians, but none the less their opinions were molded by Bucer.

One reason why Bucer was able to lead the theologians of the moderate Zwinglian party to Wittenberg was that he was the leader, more than any other man, in the organization of the Protestant churches of Southwestern Germany. His most important activities here were in Ulm, Augsburg, and Hesse, but many other cities and states called upon him to draw up ecclesiastical ordinances, settle local disputes, recommend suitable pastors, and conduct preaching campaigns. Sometimes he would go to the locality for two or three months. At other times he would stop on his way to some conference, and even while he was busy in Strasbourg he kept up a steady correspondence with the churches in the valleys of the Rhine and Danube. Yet he never organized a Bucerian church. He was content simply to establish on a firm basis the general principles of the Reformation.

Bucer's greatest claim to recognition by historians is one which is little known today, namely his work as an imperial statesman. The situation in Germany in the spring of 1539 was a critical one. The Reformation had come to a fork in the road. In one direction was civil war; in the other compromise. The Protestants had increased in strength until now they could fight if necessary, and probably would fight unless some of their demands were granted. Division was dangerously near and Bucer dreaded it. He wanted a united German nation. He saw that somehow a religious compromise must be found. But the task of formulating such a compromise was not easy, for there was not only the problem of theology, but also the necessity for a reorganization of the clergy and for a settlement of ecclesiastical property that would please both sides. These were hard problems, and in his opinion the best way to solve them was to call a religious colloquy. The emperor agreed with him, for at that moment diplomacy suited his situation better than war. The consequence was not one colloquy only, but a series of con-

ferences in which Bucer was the leader of the Protestants both in championing their doctrinal beliefs and also in seeking a plan of ecclesiastical organization on which Germany might unite. He wrote books suggesting solutions, he negotiated with noblemen and magistrates to gain their support for peace, and he took a leading part in the discussions.

The first of the colloquies was held in Frankfurt in 1539, and the emperor gained from the Protestants a most advantageous truce, in return for which he gave only empty promises.⁵¹ This stinging diplomatic defeat aroused in Bucer the determination that the next colloquy should be a real national council in which the main Protestant doctrines would be approved and a religious settlement reached.⁵² To gain this end he adopted a policy of forming a coalition party of moderate Catholics and moderate Protestants. His aim was to have this party adopt a tentative formula of concord and grow strong enough to force it upon the emperor, the pope, and the extreme Protestants. But at the colloquy of Hagenau in 1540 the dispute over the mode of procedure was so bitter that no discussion of religion took place.⁵³ Still Bucer made good progress toward the formation of a coalition by enlisting the assistance of Hermann von Wied, Archbishop of Cologne.⁵⁴ Not only Hermann, but also his leading theologian, John Gropper, supported Bucer's program.⁵⁵ The reformer was thus placed in a position to begin action on the second element of his policy, the drafting of a tentative formula of concord. At the colloquy of Worms, in the same year, a start was made. It happened that, as at Hagenau, disputes over the mode of procedure delayed the opening of the discussions. While the deadlock continued, the imperial minister, Granvelle, organized a secret colloquy in which Gropper and

⁵¹ Walch, XVII, 308.

⁵² M. Bucer, *Etliche gesprech vom Nürnbergischen fridestand*, Strasbourg, 1539, see pp. Aii, Biii, C, Ciii; Eii, F, Mii, Oiii; M. Lenz, *Briefwechsel Landgraf Philipp's des Grossmüthigen von Hessen mit Bucer*, Leipzig, 1880 ff., I, 68-78, 90-93.

⁵³ M. Bucer, *Vom tag zu Hagenaw*, 1548; C. W. Hering, *Geschichte der kirchlichen Unionsversuche seit der Reformation bis auf unsere Zeit*, Leipzig, 1836, p. 41.

⁵⁴ M. Bucer, *Von den einigen rechten wege*, 1545, p. 87; Lenz, I, 189; Arbenz and Wartmann, V, 633.

⁵⁵ Bucer, *Von den einigen*, 56-62; W. v. Gulick, *Johannes Gropper*, 1906, pp. 68-69.

Veltwyck represented the Catholics, while the Protestant spokesmen were Bucer and his fellow citizen Capito. Bucer was not responsible for initiating negotiations, nor did he compose the theological formula with which their conferences ended, but he assisted the attempt in every possible way and did his best to gain for the formula the support of the leading Protestants. Its origin was kept secret.⁵⁶

Meanwhile the formal colloquy of Worms had been opened, and then was prorogued to continue at the Diet of Regensburg in 1541.⁵⁷ There the emperor chose three collocutors from each side: from the Catholics, Gropper, Eck, and Pflug; from the Protestants, Melanchthon, Pistorius, and Bucer.⁵⁸ As a guide for their discussions he laid before them an anonymous set of articles, and asked for their approval, disapproval, or correction.⁵⁹ These articles were none other than those composed at the secret colloquy of Worms, and at once received the title of the Regensburg Book.⁶⁰ Bucer and Gropper argued for its acceptance in a modified form. It looked as if success were at hand. A formula of concord was actually in existence, a strong centre-party was forming; but so bitter was the opposition of Melanchthon on one side and of Eck on the other that little could be done. Only on the article of justification was it possible to reach an agreement of any importance,⁶¹ and that was soon repudiated by the Catholics. So Bucer failed in his attempt to find a basis of union for Protestants and Catholics, and never afterwards did the two parties approach so near to a compromise as in 1541.

During the summer of that year Bucer's policy underwent a

⁵⁶ H. Eells, 'The Origin of the Regensburg Book,' *Princeton Theological Review*, XXVI, 363-366.

⁵⁷ E. Doumergue, *Jean Calvin*, Lausanne, 1899 ff., II, 617-619; A. Blatter, *Die Thätigkeit Melanchthons bei den Unionsversuchen 1539-1541*, Bern, 1899, p. 54; Bucer, *Von den einigen*, 39; *Corpus Reformatorum*, IV, 86-88.

⁵⁸ Lenz, III, 18-19; M. Bucer, *Alle Handlungen*, 1541, p. 26.

⁵⁹ *Corpus Reformatorum*, IV, 253, 547; P. Vetter, *Die Religionsverhandlungen auf dem Reichstage zu Regensburg, 1541*, 1889, p. 1.

⁶⁰ H. Eells, 'The Origin of the Regensburg Book,' *Princeton Theological Review*, XXVI, 363 ff.

⁶¹ T. Brieger, *De Formulae Concordiae Ratisbonensis origine atque indole*, Halle, 1870, pp. 16 ff., 65; J. Eck, *Apologia*, Cologne, 1542, p. eihi.

decided change. Convinced that nothing more could be accomplished by conciliation, he now adopted other means for winning as much of Germany as possible to the Reformation. He aimed to gain the acceptance by the Catholic states of the articles agreed upon at Regensburg, and to use this as an opening wedge for greater progress in reform.⁶² Instead of a conciliator, he became an uncompromising propagandist, wrote fierce polemics against Catholic antagonists, and urged the Smalkaldic League to aggressive measures. In carrying out this new policy his most important activity was the Reformation of Cologne.

Archbishop Hermann of Cologne desired a partial and gradual reformation of his diocese, to remove the worst evils and introduce such changes as a reformed administration of the sacraments.⁶³ In 1542 he called upon Bucer to come to Bonn, conduct a campaign of preaching, and organize the church on a new basis.⁶⁴ Bucer was chosen partly because he led the moderate Protestant party and would be most acceptable to the moderate Catholics led by Gropper. But for some reason Gropper turned against the whole undertaking⁶⁵ and became the leader of a vigorous party of opposition that centred in the chapter and university of Cologne. While Bucer was gaining popular support by his sermons in Bonn, his opponents demanded his dismissal⁶⁶ and published attacks upon him.⁶⁷ He fired pamphlets back at them and challenged them to a disputation,⁶⁸ but they naturally would not consent to a public debate in which he could advertise his views.⁶⁹ The contest was close, and both sides appealed to their friends far and near to come to

⁶² Cf. M. Bucer, *Abusum ecclesiasticorum*, Strasbourg, 1541.

⁶³ Cf. Hering, 120.

⁶⁴ Lenz, I, 189; *Thesaurus Baumianus*, XIII, 136; Schiess, II, 104, 124; *Corpus Reformatorum*; *Calvini Opera Omnia*, 1866 ff., XI, 456.

⁶⁵ C. Varrentrapp, *Hermann von Wied und sein Reformationsversuch in Köln*, Leipzig, 1878, pp. 51, 131-133; Gulick, 87-89, 92.

⁶⁶ Gulick, 92.

⁶⁷ Varrentrapp, 142-143.

⁶⁸ M. Bucer, *Was in Namen zu Bonn, 1543*; M. Bucer, *Die ander verteydigung, 1543*; K. and W. Kraft, *Briefe und Documente aus der Zeit der Reformation im 16. Jahrhundert*, Elberfeld, 1873, pp. 56, 59.

⁶⁹ Kraft, 56, 59; Bucer, *Die ander verteydigung*, preface; Virck, Winckelmann, and Bernays, III, 408.

their aid.⁷⁰ Thus the Reformation of Cologne became a focus of the struggle between the Reformation and the Counter-reformation in Germany. Melanchthon and others came to Bucer's aid,⁷¹ and all watched with intense interest for the issue.

By the summer of 1543 Bucer felt ready for a decisive move. At the archbishop's request he composed a code of ecclesiastical ordinances for the organization of the diocese.⁷² Melanchthon revised and approved them.⁷³ A meeting of the estates was called, and on July 23, 1543, the ordinances were laid before them. Only the clergy failed to accept the code, and they were so divided that they were unable to reach an opinion and were allowed two weeks in which to prepare an answer.⁷⁴ Officially, the attempt to reform the diocese of Cologne had succeeded. In reality, it had shown that there were limits which the Reformation as a movement could not pass; that there was a fundamental divergence of opinion on religion, and that neither side could convince the other. The moderate Catholics and moderate Protestants were destined not to unite but to separate, the one party to stay within the Roman Church and the other to remain outside. For Bucer's reputation the episode had a most important consequence. Before this, his moderation had gained for him the reproach of being untrustworthy, a man who would sacrifice essential beliefs in order to attain peace. Now he gained celebrity as one of the champions of an aggressive Protestantism — a man who fought his enemies with all the vigor and energy at his command.⁷⁵ None were quicker to recognize this change than the Catholic leaders, and all the rest of his life they attacked him in vicious polemics. Had it not been for

⁷⁰ Lenz, II, 121 ff.; Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, XXXIII, Lucca, 1755, xxi ff.; J. Sleidan, *De Statu Religionis et Reipublicae Carolo Quinto Caesare Commentarii*, 1557, p. 245.

⁷¹ Lenz, II, 121–125, 128, 130, 138, 145, 147; *Thesaurus Baumianus*, XIII, 160; XIV, 24; *Corpus Reformatorum*, V, 100; Krafft, 64; Varrentrapp, 157.

⁷² *Thesaurus Baumianus*, XIII, 149; Krafft, 88; *Corpus Reformatorum*, V, 113; Varrentrapp, 176; M. Bucer, *Von Gottes Gnaden . . . bedenken*, 1543; H. E. Jacobs, *The Lutheran Movement in England*, Philadelphia, 1890, p. 227.

⁷³ *Corpus Reformatorum*, V, 113; Krafft, 80.

⁷⁴ Varrentrapp, 205–208.

⁷⁵ Cf. Schiess, II, 112, 117, 160 ff., 206–207; *Corpus Reformatorum*, V, 103; *Thesaurus Baumianus*, XIV, 87, 110, 115.

the Smalkaldic War it is quite possible that Cologne would not have been the last of the ecclesiastical territories into which Bucer would have carried a vigorous campaign of reform. But, war or no war, the result would have been the same, a division on religion.

As the Smalkaldic War drew near, it found Martin Bucer one of the most uncompromising of partisans. At the Colloquy of Ratisbon in 1546, where he was the chief speaker for the Protestants, he quibbled over the minutiae of procedure so fiercely that the Catholics, who were equally unyielding, suspended negotiations.⁷⁶ At the close of the war, when the emperor counted upon him as a notorious moderate to lend his prestige to the Augsburg Interim, he refused to sanction one jot or one tittle of the document.⁷⁷ He went back to Strasbourg to fight relentlessly against any terms of peace that countenanced what he thought false in religion.⁷⁸ He insisted upon attacking the mass, and the emperor insisted upon establishing it. It became only a question of time when the magistrates would be forced to decide either to exile Bucer or to fight the emperor, and Bucer was told he must go.⁷⁹ On April 6, 1549, he left the city as he had come, a fugitive. It was a bitter punishment for him, for he loved his home,⁸⁰ and it was a strange paradox that he, who had all his life suffered from the taunt that he was too ready to compromise, should have been exiled because he refused to do so.

At the invitation of Thomas Cranmer he went to England, where for two years he lived highly honored.⁸¹ He was made *Regius Professor of Theology* at Cambridge; he was consulted on important theological questions;⁸² he was given favors by

⁷⁶ M. Bucer, *Ein warhaffter berichte vom Colloquio zu Regensburg, Strasbourg, 1546*; M. Bucer, *Disputata Ratisbonae, 1548*; F. Roth, 'Der offizielle Bericht von den Evangelischen zum Regensburger Gespräch Verordneten,' *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*, V, 1.

⁷⁷ Schiess, II, 702; Anrich, 108.

⁷⁸ Schiess, II, 702, 703, 720, 735; *Calvini Opera*, XIII, 5, 49.

⁷⁹ *Calvini Opera*, XIII, 197-199; Erichson, 63; *Original Letters*, II, 538.

⁸⁰ *Calvini Opera*, XIII, 355.

⁸¹ A. E. Harvey, *Martin Bucer in England*, Marburg, 1906.

⁸² Bucer, *Scripta Anglicana*, 456-503, 681-683, 705-710, 862; *Original Letters*, II, 544; Harvey, 131-134, 141-159.

the king;⁸³ but he was never happy. The chilly climate, the strange food, and the separation from his friends combined with ill-health to undermine his strength.⁸⁴ After several severe spells of sickness he finally succumbed on March 1, 1551.⁸⁵ Just how far he influenced the English Reformation is hard to say. On the one hand, there is little evidence that anything was done as a direct result of his advice. On the other, it is certain that his opinion was regarded very highly and that his books were widely read.⁸⁶ He favored a moderate type of reform in such matters as the liturgy,⁸⁷ and advocated an education of the people in the principles of reform by preaching.⁸⁸ The Catholics considered him one of their worst enemies, for in the reign of Mary they thought it worth while to drag his body from its grave and burn it to ashes.⁸⁹ But when Elizabeth became queen, his friends organized an expiatory service in which atonement was publicly made for the indignities which his body had suffered,⁹⁰ and from that day to this the name of Martin Bucer has been respected and honored in England.⁹¹

If Bucer made such important contributions to the progress of the Reformation, why is so little known about him? Why have historians given him so little space in their writings? One reason is that he left behind him no organized sect which felt it their duty to perpetuate his memory. On the other hand there grew up an ultra-lutheran party in Germany which did its best to obliterate his memory in order that what they considered his false views on the Lord's Supper might be forgotten. At Strasbourg this party was so strong that they prevented the publication in that city of some of his works and letters collected by

⁸³ Cf. G. Burnet, *The History of the Reformation of the Church of England*, New York, 1843, II, 248.

⁸⁴ *Thesaurus Baumianus*, XX, 179; Harvey, 29 and n. 1, 110, 122; *Original Letters*, II, 543 ff.; *Corpus Reformatorum*, VII, 732; *Calvini Opera*, XIII, 355.

⁸⁵ Harvey, 91 and n. 4.

⁸⁶ Cf. above, note 82.

⁸⁷ Bucer, *Scripta Anglicana*, 456-503.

⁸⁸ *Calvini Opera*, XIII, 357.

⁸⁹ Bucer, *Scripta Anglicana*, 915-933.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* 935-936.

⁹¹ Cf. J. Milton, *The Prose Works of John Milton*, London, 1848, III, 274; T. M. Lindsay, 'Martin Bucer and the Reformation,' *Quarterly Review*, vol. 220, p. 116.

his secretary.⁹² Ever since then it has been difficult for those interested in him to gather the sources for a study of his life. His handwriting was almost illegible,⁹³ his books were often so carelessly composed that they lost popular appeal, and the agents of the Catholic Church destroyed many of the copies in existence. The fundamental reason why he has been largely ignored until recent years is that he worked against the trend of historical development. There were three conceivable methods for settling the problems of Germany in his day: compromise, conviction, and conquest. Bucer championed the first two. They failed, and his memory was swallowed up in their defeat.

⁹² J. Sturm, *Erinnerungsschrift*, Neustadt a.H., 1581, p. 35; L. Büchschütz, *Histoire des Liturgies en Langue allemande dans l'Église de Strasbourg au XVI^e Siècle*, Paris, 1900, p. 114.

⁹³ Cf. facsimile in G. Mentz, *Handschriften der Reformationszeit*, Bonn, 1912, Table 23b.

ARMENIAN MANUSCRIPTS OF ST. ATHANASIUS OF ALEXANDRIA

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THE Armenian version of the works of Athanasius is known to European scholars from four sources: (1) the list in Karekin's catalogue of early Armenian translations,¹ (2) Conybeare's edition of the pseudo-athanasian "Dialogue between Athanasius and Zacchaeus,"² (3) an article by the same scholar, 'On the Sources of the Text of St. Athanasius,'³ with accompanying collations of the Armenian of *De Incarnatione et contra Arianos* and *Quod unus sit Christus*, and (4) the Venice edition of Armenian Athanasiana made by E. Tajezi and published with Conybeare's help at the Mechitarist press in 1899.⁴ This edition contains all the material then available in the Mechitarists' library at Venice but is not based on a complete survey of the sources.⁵ Furthermore, the manuscripts employed are (with the one exception of Cod. Venet. 818) collections of various patristic writings, and do not contain corpora of Athanasius's works such as are commonly found in Greek. For a new edition of the Armenian Athanasius the primary necessity is fresh manuscript material, and it is therefore fortunate that the large collection acquired by the Mechitarists of Vienna since the publication of Dashian's catalogue⁶ includes two codices which contain not merely treatises of Athanasius but corpora of his

¹ Zarphanalian Karekin, *Catalogue des anciennes traductions arméniennes siècles IV-XIII* (in Armenian), Venice, 1889, pp. 278 ff. A shorter list is given in *Quadro delle opere di vari autori anticamente tradotte in armeno*, Venezia, 1825, pp. 11-13.

² *Anecdota Oxoniensia, Classical Series, Part VIII*, Oxford, 1898.

³ *Journal of Philology*, XXIV, pp. 285-300.

⁴ *Works of St. Athanasius* (in Armenian), Venice, 1899.

⁵ Tajezi, pp. *h. p.*

⁶ I am greatly indebted to the Mechitarists at Vienna and Venice for access to the manuscripts and especially to Fr. Mesrop Hopazian, who secured me photographs, and to Fr. Akinian, who gave me invaluable assistance in using them. My thanks are also due to Professor R. P. Blake for kind suggestions.

writings comparable in extent and significance to the corpora of the Greek manuscripts.

One of these, Mechitaristen-Bibliothek, Cod. 629, is a nineteenth-century paper manuscript, 20 × 15 cm., written in a clear *notragir* hand with twenty-three lines to the page. On the flyleaf is a note in modern Armenian which reads, 'Bought in Constantinople from Ter Johan, Priest, Mkrean,' and on f. 231 is an observation by the same Fr. Mkrean, 'Note: The scribe of this book is the Venerable Galoust, a teacher, son of Paul of Samathia, my dear friend. John, Priest, Mkrean.' Father Mkrean was a Constantinopolitan priest who engaged in an extensive traffic in manuscripts, and Galoust, the son of his old friend, was evidently employed to copy manuscripts of exceptional interest which passed through his hands or to which he had access. This one was made from a copy of a late 18th-century manuscript at Ispahan, but its late date is no prejudice to its authority, and the omission of many pages indicates that the archetype of Cod. 629 was probably a manuscript of respectable age which had suffered some damage in the course of an itinerant career in the Orient. The contents are as follows:

1. ff. 4a-30b. Epistola I ad Serapionem, Migne P. S. xxvi, 529-607; Tajezi, pp. 88-116. **Թուղթ յաղագս ամենասուրբ Հոգւոյն**: 'Letter concerning the most holy Spirit.'

2. ff. 30b-33b. The rest of f. 30b, f. 31a, and the first two-thirds of f. 32b are blank, though this is not noted in the table of contents and doubtless represents a lacuna in the exemplar. A text then begins without heading or title and runs to f. 33b; it is easily identified as the last few paragraphs of Epistola II ad Serapionem, P. G. xxvi, 620 B ὁ χαρακτήρ τοίνυν τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ πίστεως ἐστὶν οὗτος . . . 624 C μυριάκις τῇ ἐαυτῶν ἀγνοίᾳ οἱ Ἀρειανοί. This second letter to Serapion does not appear in Tajezi or in Cod. 648.

3. ff. 33b-38a. Epistola III ad Serapionem, P. G. xxvi, 623c-637a. **Հետեւումն յառաջասացելոց, յաղագս նոյնինքն ամենասուրբ Հոգւոյն**: 'Conclusion of what has been said before concerning the same most holy Spirit.'

4. ff. 38a-65b. **Գիր յանտիոքացւոցն եկեղեցի. յաղագս զանազան Աստուածաբանութեան եւ լուծման ճառից**

զոր ասացեալ էր յանդիմամարտից Արիոսին հետեւողացն հերձուածոց ըստ իւրեանց մտաց: 'Letter to the church of the Antiochenes concerning diverse doctrines and comments, which he spoke against the hostile [and], in their opinions, heretical followers of Arius.'

Ամենեքեան ոյք յԱյ. ի ձեռն բանին հոգւովն սուրբով 'ի քարոզութիւն առաքեալ սուրբ մարգարէքն եւ առաքեալք... ասէ Աստուած ոչ մնացէ հոգի իմ 'ի մարդկանս յայսմ յաւիտեանս վս. լինելոյ նոցա մարմին: Եւ Ք.սի Այ. մերոյ փառք յաւիտեանս ամէն.

This piece is a refutation of Arianism constructed as a discussion of biblical texts in the manner of the *Orationes contra Arianos* and the *De incarnatione et contra Arianos*. It is not identical with the *Tomus ad Antiochenos*, nor, so far as I have been able to find, with any other known work of Athanasius.

5. ff. 66a-73b. Epistola ad Epictetum, P. G. xxvi, 1049-1069. Առ Եպտիա (sic) Եպիսկոպոս Կորընթացւոց. Յաղաքս ուղղափառ հաւատոյ ընդդիմադրութիւն սակս յարուցելոյ ոմանց հակառակ ճշմարիտ սիրոյ հաւատոյս: 'Concerning the orthodox faith, refutation of the opposition of some to the true and holy faith.' This version, which is found also in Cod. 648, is different both in text and title from that published by Tajezi, pp. 324-343.

6. ff. 73b-79a. Ad Adelphium, P. G. xxvi, 1072-1083; Tajezi, pp. 124-133. Առ Փիլադելփոս եպ.: 'To Philadelphus bishop.' The Armenian both of Tajezi and of the two Vienna mss. ends with the greeting and omits the final injunction, ἐρρῶσθαι σε καὶ . . . Ἱερακῆ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ.

7. ff. 79a-80a. Ad Liberium, P. G. xxviii, 1444-1445; Tajezi, pp. 117-118. Առ Լիթէոս (sic)⁷ Եպիսկոպոսապեան Հռովմայ, զոր պահանջեաց ի նմանէ գրեաց այսպէս: 'To Liberius archbishop of Rome, that which he required of him he wrote thus.' The Armenian both of Tajezi's edition and of the two Vienna mss. adds a doxology which is not in the Greek.

⁷ This is also the spelling of Cod. 648 and the colophon. See below.

8. ff. 80a-82b. *Expositio fidei*, P. G. xxv, 200-208; Tajezi, pp. 119-123. Յաղագս սրբոյ Երրորդութեան: 'Concerning the holy Trinity.'

9. ff. 82b-91b. *Sermo contra omnes haereses*, P. G. xxviii, 501-524. Ասացեալ հակառակ բոլոր հերձուածոց: 'That which was spoken against all heresies.'

10. ff. 91b-107b. *De incarnatione et contra Arianos*, P. G. xxvi, 984-1028. Յաղագս սրբոյ Երրորդութեան եւ մարմնաւորութեան որդւոյ ասացեալ ընդդէմ Արիանոսաց: 'Concerning the holy Trinity and the Incarnation of the Son, spoken against the Arians.' This version, which is also found in Cod. 648, is different in text and title from that published by Tajezi, pp. 27-56. Both Vienna mss. conclude the treatise with a doxology found neither in the Greek nor in Tajezi.

11. ff. 107b-110b. Ի բան ըստ Մատթէոսի աւետարանին, որ ոք ասացէ բան զորդւոյ մարդոյ թողցի նմա. իսկ որ ոք ասացէ զհոգւոյն սուրբոյ, մի՛ թողցի նմա՝ ոչ յայսմ յաւիտենի, եւ ոչ 'ի հանդերձելումն: 'On the verse according to the gospel of Matthew, He who will say a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him, but he who will speak against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this age nor in the future.' This is a fragment of *Epistola IV ad Serapionem*, P. G. xxvi, 648, *περὶ δὲ οὗ γράφων ἐδήλωσας εὐαγγελικοῦ ῥητοῦ κτλ.* In Greek manuscripts it is found in the collection of twenty-one treatises in L and its allies, but not in S, where the text of *Epistola IV ad Serapionem* is given complete.⁸

12-13. ff. 112a-131b. *Disputatio contra Arium*, P. G. xxviii, 440 ff. The Greek piece is divided in the Armenian, and the transition, *λοιπὸν περὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ζητήσωμεν*, replaced by a title. There are notable differences between the text of Tajezi and that of Cod. 629. Neither is exactly coextensive with the Greek, but Tajezi's contains a few more lines than Cod. 629.

ff. 112a-127a. Տրամախօսութիւն ի Ժողով Նիկիոյ առ Արիոսն, յամի Ա. ծայնոյ մարմնաւորութեան ԳՃԺ,

⁸ F. Wallis, 'On Some Manuscripts of the Writings of St. Athanasius,' *Journal of Theological Studies*, III (1901), pp. 101, 106; K. Lake, 'Some Further Notes on the mss. of the Writings of St. Athanasius,' *ibid.* V, 1904, pp. 110-111.

յաւուրսն բարեպաշտ Թազաւորին Կոստանդիանոսի, եւ երանելոյ պապայն Սեղբեստրոսի, եւ եպիսկոպոսութեան Վիղանդիու Աղեքսանդրու: 'Dialogue on the Council of Nicea against Arius, in the year 310 (*sic*) of the divine incarnation, in the days of the pious emperor Constantine and of the blessed Pope Sylvester and of the episcopacy of Byzantium (*sic*) of Alexander.' P. G. xxviii, 440-488c, . . . καὶ μία παντοκρατορία τυγχάνει; Tajezi, pp. 134-182.

ff. 127-131b. *Նոցունց խնդիր դարձեալ յաղագս սրբոյ Հոգւոյն*: 'Dispute of the same again, concerning the Holy Spirit.' P. G. xxviii, 488c, ἐπειδὴ μάλιστα ὠρίσω το 497A θεὸς ποῦ γέγραπται τὸ πνεῦμα; Tajezi, pp. 182-190. Tajezi's text extends to P. G. xxviii, 497A, . . . ἀλλὰ τῷ θεῷ.

14. ff. 131b-155a. 'Dialogue between Athanasius and Zacchaeus.' Edited by F. C. Conybeare, *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, Classical Series, Part VIII; Tajezi, pp. 191-234. *Նորրն Սըրրոյն Աթանասի եւ Չաքէչոսի առն Հրէի խնդիր յաղագս Աստուածութեան որդւոյ*: 'Dispute of the same St. Athanasius and Zacchaeus against the Jews, concerning the divinity of the Son.'

15. ff. 155a-170b. *Յաղագս խորհրդածութեան մկրտւելոց ա. ծուաւյելուվ վարդապետութեան*⁹: 'Concerning the mystery of the doctrine acceptable to God for those baptized.'

ԺԱ. Արժան եւ վայելուչ է յաղագս հանդերձեալ որ առ ձեզս բանի առնուլ հասարակաց յայւոցիկ զբարոզն ճշմարտութեան զԵսայիաս. . . ԺԱ. Եղիցի եւ մեզ ամենեցուն եւ ամ. Ժողովրդեանս առ արինական գործովք եւ ճշմարիտ գիտութեամբ կատարեալս հանդիպել 'ի փրկիչն աշխարհի եւ հասանել արքայութեան երկնից ի Քս. Յս. 'ի Տէր մեր: Որով եւ ընդ որում հօր փառք պատիւ եւ զօրութիւն ամենասուրբն Հոգւով, այժմ եւ յաւիտեանս յաւիտենից, ամէն:

This is a treatise on baptism addressed to catechumens. So far as I can discover, it is not identical with any known work

⁹ The title reads somewhat differently in Cod. 648: *Յաղագս խորհրդածութեան մկրտելոց. յորում եւ Աստուածավայելչազոյն վարդապետութեան*: Still another form appears in the colophon (No. 14), discussed below.

of Athanasius. A treatise on baptism ascribed to Athanasius, but with a different incipit, is found in a Syriac manuscript of the thirteenth century, Brit. Mus., Add. 14,727, ff. 55a-105a. See Wright, Catalogue of Syriac mss., II, p. 887.

16. ff. 171a-192a. In passionem et crucem Domini, P. G. xxviii, 185-249. **Ի չարչարանս եւ յարութեան Տեառն մերոյ**¹⁰ **Յ.սի Ք.սի մարմնացելոյն ճշմարտի Այ. մերոյ**: 'On the sufferings and resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ, our very God incarnate.'

17. ff. 192b-193b. **Աղօթք**: 'Prayers.' Inc. **Ո՛վ երանելի ճշմարտապէս եւ կենդանարար խաչ փրկչին՝ որ զմահ նշաւակեցեր...** Des. **եւ երաչափառն այս էր փրկչին զի խաչեալ չարչարեցաւ վասն մարդկան, եւ նշաւակեալ խափանցեալ զմահ և...** The *desinit* breaks off in the middle of a sentence at the end of the paper, evidently because of a lacuna in the exemplar.

18. ff. 194a-201b. **Յաղագս կուսութեան**: 'Concerning virginity.' A fragment of this treatise, otherwise unknown, has been edited from a Syriac manuscript of the British Museum, Add. 14,607, saec. vi-vii, by Professor J. Lebon, 'Athanasiana syriaca I, Un λόγος περί παρθενίας attribué à saint Athanase d'Alexandrie,' Le Muséon, XL (1927), pp. 205 ff. The text is fragmentary in Cod. 629 but complete in Cod. 648. See below.

19. ff. 202a-205b are blank and are followed (ff. 206a-209a) by the end of an ascetic discourse which is identical with neither the Greek *De virginitate* (P. G. xxviii, 251-281) nor with the 'Letter to the virgins' published by Lebon, 'Athanasiana syriaca II,' Le Muséon, XLI, pp. 169 ff. Des. . . . **ուր ճշմարտապէս փափաքանան ամ. սուրբք. անդ եւ դու դաւաւորիս ընդ բոլոր հրեշտակացն գունդս յաւիտեան եւ յաւիտեանս յաւիտենից ամէն**:

20. ff. 209a-210b. De incarnatione dei verbi, P. G. xxviii, 25-29; Tajezi, pp. 281-283. **Արտագրութիւն առաքելական յաղագս**¹¹ **Ա.ծայնոյ մարմնաւորութեան Այ. բանի**: 'Apostolic exposition of the divine incarnation of the Word of God.'

¹⁰ Cod. 648 adds **եւ փրկչին**.

¹¹ Cod. 648 omits **յաղագս**.

21. ff. 210b-210a^a. Epistola ad Jovianum de fide, P. G. xxviii, 532; Tajezi, p. 344. Առ Յորիանոս¹² Թագաւոր. Յաղագս Հաւատոյ: 'To the Emperor Jovian concerning faith.'

22. ff. 210a^a-214b. Quod unus sit Christus, P. G. xxviii, 121-132; Tajezi, pp. 56-63. Վասն¹³ Հաւատոյ՝ Թէ մի է Իս. ընդդէմ Պօղոսի Սամաստացոյ¹⁴: 'Concerning [the] faith that Christ is one, against Paul of Samosata.'

23. ff. 214b-216b. Homily on John 12, 27, P. G. xxvi, 1240-1244; Tajezi, pp. 64-67. Զոր Թէ՛ այժմ անձն իմ խռովեալ է: 'On "My soul is troubled."'

24. ff. 216b-230b. Contra Apollinarium II, P. G. xxvi, 1132-1165; Tajezi, pp. 68-88. Յաղագս փրկական¹⁵ Յայտնութեան Տեառն մերոյ Յիսուսի Քրիստոսի: 'Concerning the saving manifestation of our Lord Jesus Christ.'

f. 231a. Subscript, cf. supra, p. 44; f. 231b blank.

f. 232a-b. Table of Contents; ff. 233-237 blank.

The second Viennese manuscript, Cod. 648, is much older and, though not dated, should probably be assigned to the thirteenth or fourteenth century.^{15a} It measures 16 × 12 cm. and is written in *bolorgir* with 27-29 lines to a page. Some of the pages have been badly worm-eaten so that the text is occasionally illegible. There is no spacing between words, and initial capitals are frequently omitted in the titles, where the scribe evidently intended to finish them off with a greater flourish but never returned to his task. On the fly-leaf is found a note similar to that in Cod. 629, 'Bought in the year 1898 in Constantinople from the priest John Mkrean in exchange for books.' Of a second note in an older hand only the letters for 'Number . . . 15,' with the date 1789, are legible. Below this the figure . . . 12 can be made out, and this may have been

¹² Cod. 648 reads Յորիանոս.

¹³ Cod. 648 adds ճառ before վասն.

¹⁴ Cod. 648 reads Սամաստացոյ.

¹⁵ Cod. 648 omits փրկական.

^{15a} It is described briefly by N. Akinian (Eine neu-entdeckte Schrift des Katholikos Johannes Odznetsi De Incarnatione Verbi, Huschardzean, Festschrift aus Anlass des 100-jährigen Bestandes [der Mechitaristen-Kongregation in Wien, Vienna, 1911, pp. 336-344], who believes it to have been written at Metzob in the fourteenth century.

part of the same date. In this manuscript the corpus of Athanasian writings is preceded by five other treatises by different authors.¹⁶ The Athanasian treatises are the following:

1. ff. 15a-25b. *De incarnatione dei verbi et contra Arianos*, P. G. xxvi, 992c τῶν αἰώνων ἦν etc. (Tajezi, p. 33, l. 3) to 1028a. The beginning of the treatise is missing in this manuscript, but the text is complete in Cod. 629, ff. 91b-107b; Tajezi, pp. 27-56.

2. ff. 25b-33a. *Sermo contra omnes haereses*, P. G. xxviii, 501-524; Cod. 629, ff. 82b-91b.

3. ff. 33a-33b. *Epistola ad Liberium*, P. G. xxviii, 1444-1445; Tajezi, pp. 117-118; Cod. 629, ff. 79b-80a.

4. ff. 33b-35b. *Expositio fidei*, P. G. xxv, 200-208; Tajezi, pp. 119-123; Cod. 629, ff. 80a-82b.

5. ff. 35b-36b. *De incarnatione dei verbi*, P. G. xxviii, 25-29; Tajezi, pp. 281-283; Cod. 629, ff. 209a-210b.

6. ff. 36b-37a. *Ad Jovianum de fide*, P. G. xxviii, 532; Tajezi, p. 344; Cod. 629, ff. 210b-210a.

7. ff. 37a-40b. *Quod unus sit Christus*, P. G. xxviii, 121-132; Tajezi, pp. 56-63; Cod. 629, ff. 210a-214b.

8. ff. 40b-42b. *Sermon on John 12, 27*, P. G. xxvi, 1240-1244; Tajezi, pp. 64-67; Cod. 629, ff. 214b-216b.

9. ff. 42b-53a. *Contra Apollinarium II*, P. G. xxvi, 1132-1165; Tajezi, pp. 68-88; Cod. 629, ff. 219b-230b.

10. ff. 53b-76a. *Epistola I ad Serapionem*, P. G. xxvi, 529-607; Tajezi, pp. 86-116; Cod. 629, ff. 4a-30b.

11. ff. 76a-80a. *Epistola III ad Serapionem*, P. G. xxvi, 623c-637A; Cod. 629, ff. 33b-38a.

12. ff. 80a-102a. *Letter to the church at Antioch against Arianism*, Cod. 629, ff. 38a-65b.

13. ff. 102b-105b. *Epistola ad Epictetum*, P. G. xxvi, 1049-1069; Tajezi, pp. 324-343; Cod. 629, ff. 66a-73b.

14. ff. 105b-112a. *Epistola ad Adelphium*, P. G. xxvi, 1072-1083; Tajezi, pp. 124-133; Cod. 629, ff. 73b-79a.

15. ff. 112a-124b. *On baptism*, Cod. 629, ff. 155a-170b.

¹⁶ These are two works ascribed to Gregory of Nazianz, one (ff. 3a-4a) on Ezekiel (P. G. xxxvi, 665-669), the other (ff. 4a-6b) a letter to Evagrius on divinity (P. G. xli, 1101 ff.; cf. xxxviii, 383), and a series of short anonymous pieces (ff. 7a-14b).

16. ff. 124b-143b. *In passionem et crucem domini*, P. G. xxviii, 185-249; Cod. 629, ff. 171-193.

17. ff. 143b-148b. *De virginitate*, Muséon, XL (1927), pp. 205 ff.; Cod. 629, ff. 194a-201b. Four pages follow with a table of contents (ff. 151a-b) in a modern hand.

Having described the Athanasian corpora in the two Vienna codices, we should now compare them with the other available Armenian evidence on this point and with the corpora of the Greek manuscripts. The Armenian evidence consists of one manuscript, Cod. Venet. 818, and a colophon of unknown origin. The manuscript is what is left of a paper codex of the twelfth century, written by Nerses of Lampron and now preserved in modern binding in the Mechitarists' library in Venice. It was used by Tajezi¹⁷ for the first eleven treatises of his edition. The order of treatises in the manuscript is as follows, but it is evident from the signatures that a piece has dropped out between the Dialogue with Zacchaeus and *Epistola I ad Serapionem*. The beginning of the latter has been lost through a cut of approximately the first ten lines of the page, and there is no reason to suppose that it was not followed by other works of Athanasius before it was damaged. It is not clear why Tajezi transposed *Epistola I ad Serapionem* from its place in the manuscript to one between *Contra Apollinarium II* and *Ad Liberium*.

1. *De incarnatione et contra Arianos*.
2. *Quod unus sit Christus*.
3. Homily on John 12, 27.
4. *Contra Apollinarium II*.
5. *Ad Liberium*.
6. *Expositio fidei*.
7. *Ad Adelphium*.
8. *Disputationes cum Ario*.
9. Dialogue between Athanasius and Zacchaeus.
10. *Epistola I ad Serapionem*. (The text is fragmentary.)

The colophon referred to is cited without mention of its

¹⁷ Pages 4-9.

source by Karekin¹⁸ in his work on ancient Armenian versions, and is reproduced by Tajezi¹⁹ and Conybeare.²⁰ It attributes the translation of seventeen treatises of Athanasius to 'the first translators,' that is, Mesrop and his school, and that of five others to a distinguished Armenian theologian and translator of the eighth century, Stephen of Siunik.

The colophon reads as follows:

1-2. *Ի հոգին ս, ճառք կրկին*, 'On the Holy Spirit, two treatises.'

3. *Ընդդէմ Արիանոսաց*, 'Against the Arians.'

4. *Ի սուրբ Երրորդութեան եւ ի մարմնաւորութեան բանին*, 'On the Holy Trinity and on the incarnation of the Logos.'

5. *Առ Իպիկտեմոն* (sic) *Եպիսկ. Կորնթացւոց*, 'To Epictetus bishop of the Corinthians.'

6. *Առ Փիլադեղոս* (sic) *Եպիսկոպոս*, 'To Philadelphus bishop.'

7. *Առ Լիբիոս* (sic) *Եպիսկ. Հռովմայ*, 'To Liberius bishop of Rome.'

8. *Յաղագս սրբոյ Երրորդութեան*, 'Concerning the Holy Trinity.'

9. *Ընդդէմ ամենայն հերձուածոց*, 'Against all heresy.'

10. *Յաղագս Հոգւոյն սրբոյ հայհոյողաց*, 'Concerning those who blaspheme the Holy Spirit.'

11. *Ընդդիմադրութիւն ընդ Արիոսի, յաղագս Աստուածութեան Որդւոյն (բանին)*, 'Dispute against Arius concerning the divinity of the Son (Logos).'

12. *Դարձեալ առ նոյն՝ յաղագս սրբոյ Հոգւոյն* 'Again against the same, concerning the Holy Spirit.'

13. *Ընդդէմ Զաքէոսի հրէի՝ յաղագս Աստուածութեան Որդւոյ*, 'Against Zacchaeus the Jew concerning the divinity of the Son.'

14. *Յաղագս խորհրդածութեանց մկրտելոց*, 'Concerning the mysteries of baptism.'

15. *Յաղագս կուսութեան*, 'Concerning virginity.'

¹⁸ Pages 287-288.

¹⁹ Pages 4-2.

²⁰ Dialogue between Athanasius and Zacchaeus, p. x.

16. *Ի չարչարանսն եւ ի յարութիւն Տեառն*, 'On the sufferings and resurrection of the Lord.'

17. *Աղօթք*, 'Prayers.' *Աւարտ Եօթնետասն ճառից սրբոյն Աթանասի՝ թարգմանեալ՝ ի յառաջին թարգմանչացն մերոց ի յունէ ի հայ բարբար*, 'End of the seventeen works of St. Athanasius translated by our first translators from Greek into the Armenian language.'

1. *Յաղագս մարմնաւորութեան Աստուծոյ բանին*, 'Concerning the incarnation of the Word of God.'

2. *Առ Յովբանոս թագաւոր. յաղագս հաւատոյ*, 'To Jovian the emperor, concerning faith.'

3. *Ընդդէմ Պաւղոսի Սամոսացոց՝ թէ մի է Ած.*, 'Against Paul of Samosata, that God is one.'

4. *Յաղագս թէ անձն իմ խռովեալ է*, 'Concerning "My soul is troubled."'

5. *Յաղագս յայտնութեան Տեառն*, 'Concerning the manifestation of the Lord.'

Աւարտ հնգեքին ճառիցն սրբոյն Աթանասի, զոր թարգմանեալ է ի յետին ժամանակս՝ Ստեփաննոսի Սիւնեաց եպիսկոպոսի, կատարեցաւ հրամայեալս ի քէն, ո՞վ վեհ, երիցս երանեալ ըսբունապետ, անուանակից եւ շնորհընկալ մեծի Ամլորդւոյն,

'End of the five treatises of St. Athanasius which were translated of late by Stephen bishop of Siunik. He completed what was ordered by thee, O sublime, thrice blessed doctor of like name and favor with the great son of a barren woman' [that is, John the Baptist].²¹

It will be observed that while some of the titles of the colophon are easily identifiable, others are in themselves ambiguous and uncertain. We are, however, helped in their identification by the curious circumstance that the order of treatises in the colophon and that in Cod. 629 are parallel. The agreement is

²¹ The person here referred to as the instigator of Stephen's translation is undoubtedly John Odznetzi, Armenian Catholicos, A.D. 717-728. It is possible that the translations were made as part of the preparations for the synod of Managkert, A.D. 726. See E. Ter-Minassiantz, *Die armenische Kirche in ihren Beziehungen zu den syrischen Kirchen* (Texte und Untersuchungen, N. F. XI, 4), Leipzig, 1904, pp. 71, 80 ff.; Fr. Tournetize, *Histoire politique et religieuse de l'Arménie*, I, Paris, 1910, p. 140.

only in two additions to the contents of the latter and the change in position of two pieces within its first group, as the following table illustrates:

	Cod. Vind. 629	Colophon	Cod. Vind. 648	Cod. Venet. 818
1.	Epistola I ad Serapionem	A. 1	10	11
2.	Epistola II ad Serapionem (fragmentary)			
3.	Epistola III ad Serapionem . .	A. 2	11	
4.	Letter to the Antiochene church	A. 3	12	
5.	Epistola ad Epictetum	A. 5	13	
6.	Epistola ad Adelphium	A. 6	14	7
7.	Epistola ad Liberium	A. 7	3	5
8.	Expositio fidei	A. 8	4	6
9.	Contra omnes haereses	A. 9	2	
10.	De incarnatione dei verbi et contra Arianos	A. 4	1	1
11.	Homily on Matt. 12, 32	A. 10		
12.	Disputatio cum Ario I	A. 11		8
13.	Disputatio cum Ario II	A. 12		8
14.	Dialogue between Athanasius and Zacchaeus	A. 13		9
15.	On baptism	A. 14	15	
16.	In passionem et crucem domini	A. 16	16	
17.	Prayers	A. 17		
18.	De virginitate	A. 15	17	
19.	Fragment of an ascetic discourse			
20.	De incarnatione dei verbi	B. 1	5	
21.	Epistola ad Jovianum de fide	B. 2	6	
22.	Quod unus sit Christus	B. 3	7	2
23.	Homily on John 12, 27	B. 4	8	3
24.	Contra Apollinarium II	B. 5	9	4

There can be little doubt that the corpus of Cod. 629 was based on that of the colophon.

A comparison of the order of Cod. 629 and the colophon with those of the other two manuscripts is also instructive. Between

them Cod. 648 and Cod. 818 contain all that is in Cod. 629 except the Homily on Matt. 12, 32, the prayers, *Epistola II ad Serapionem*, and the fragmentary ascetic discourse. The homily and prayers appear in the colophon, but *Epistola II ad Serapionem* and the ascetic discourse do not. This suggests that they are specific additions of Cod. 629 and do not belong to the corpus from which it descends. Furthermore, all four lists have sequences of at least three treatises in common, and Cod. 648 and Cod. 818 each have sequences in common with Cod. 629 and the colophon but not supported by the other. For instance, *Disputationes cum Ario* are followed by the Dialogue between Athanasius and Zacchaeus in Cod. 629, the colophon, and Cod. 818, but are omitted from Cod. 648, while in Cod. 648 the treatise on baptism is followed by *In passionem et crucem domini*, and *De incarnatione dei verbi* is followed by *Epistola ad Jovianum*, as in Cod. 629 and the colophon, but the four pieces do not appear in Cod. 818. It is therefore impossible to suppose that the colophon is an expansion of either Cod. 648 or Cod. 818. That the corpora of Cod. 648 and Cod. 818 are modifications of the original corpus represented by Cod. 629 and the colophon is not only highly probable in itself but is confirmed by the fact that in Cod. 648 a reminiscence of the colophon survives. On f. 35b between the end of *Expositio fidei* and the title of *De incarnatione dei verbi* is written *այսք աստջիկա (յ) հինգ ճասս՝ Ստեփանոսի է թարգմանեալ էմէլ*: 'These present five works were translated for us by Stephen.' Now the five treatises which follow are precisely those which form the colophon's second group but were evidently displaced from their natural position at the end of the corpus by the compiler of Cod. 648. The reasons for this modification of the original order, both here and in Cod. 818, are not apparent, but are probably connected with convenience or accidents in copying.

An important test of this tentative genealogy of the Armenian corpora is a comparison with the Greek corpora. It is clear that neither the corpus of Cod. 629 and the colophon, nor either modification of it in Cod. 648 and Cod. 818, was derived from

any of the known Greek collections.²³ With the elimination of Greek influence, therefore, and in the absence of evidence for earlier Armenian corpora, no reason appears for supposing the order within each of the two groups of the colophon to be other than arbitrary.

A more difficult problem is to estimate the value of the statements about the translations made in the colophon. From the conclusion of the colophon itself it appears to have been written not long after the translations made by Stephen of Siunik and within the lifetime of John Odznetzi. Accordingly, unless firm ground be discovered for rejecting it, the statement about the last five treatises may be accepted. The question, however, as to the group assigned to 'the first translators' is different. The best check here would be by a thorough philological study of the texts themselves,²⁴ but a cursory examination of the language is enough to show that the evidence of the colophon is not to be taken at its face value, and that, in their present form, at least some of the pieces ascribed to 'the first translators' must be assigned to a later date. Furthermore the work was not done by a single hand or even by a single school, for some of the translations, for example, Tajezi's text of the Letter to Epictetus, are free and idiomatic, while others exhibit the stiff literalness of the Grecophiles, so that it seems likely that they were texts current in Armenia before the eighth century, which a natural but mistaken enthusiasm assigned to the golden age of Armenian literature.

²³ See note 7 above, and K. Lake and R. P. Casey 'The Text of the De Incarnatione of Athanasius,' *Harvard Theological Review*, XIX, 1926, pp. 259-270; A. Stegmann, *Die pseudo-athanasianische 'IV. Rede gegen die Arianer'* als 'κατὰ Ἀρειανῶν λόγος' ein Apollinarisgut, Rottenburg, 1917, pp. 9 ff.

²⁴ Even this method, however, is not without its uncertainties, and it must be admitted that a secure basis for the chronology of early Armenian literature has not as yet been established. Affinities and developments in language and style are evident and well recognized in the texts, but widely divergent views are held about their dating. These differences have emerged with great clearness in the discussion of the age of the Armenian version of the Bible, particularly of the New Testament. See F. Macler, *Le texte arménien de l'évangile* (Anales du Musée Guimet, XXVIII), Paris, 1919, with full bibliography; R. P. Blake in *Harvard Theological Review*, XXI, 1928, pp. 286 ff.; Zarpahanian Karekin, pp. 1 ff.; and also J. Manandean, *Թուճարան դպրոցը եւ նրա զարգացման շրջանները*, Vienna, 1928.

In spite of some uncertainties the evidence before us suggests the following history of the Armenian version of Athanasius. At various times between the fifth and eighth centuries works of a dogmatic and edifying character attributed to Athanasius were rendered into Armenian. Shortly after this an unknown editor assembled a corpus of these translations, some of which, with questionable insight, he ascribed to 'the first translators,' others, with definite knowledge, to Stephen of Siunik. On the basis of this corpus and with but slight alterations was formed the corpus now found in Cod. Vind. 629; more radical modifications produced the collections in Cod. Venet. 818 (twelfth century) and Cod. Vind. 648 (thirteenth to fourteenth century). Neither the original corpus nor any of its dependents appears to have been influenced by the Greek corpora. Other works of Athanasius were probably translated into Armenian at an early period but were not included in the original corpus. Of this a conspicuous example is the Life of Anthony, which, both on philological grounds and from external evidence, is generally admitted to be one of the earliest of Armenian translations.²⁵ The *Հինք Հաւատոյ*, a monophysite catena made early in the seventh century, has Athanasian quotations from Oratio III contra Arianos, Tomus ad Antiochenos, Contra Apollinarium I, and the Festal Letters, as well as from De passione et cruce domini;²⁶ and identification of Athanasian quotations in the Liber Epistolarum²⁷ and in several unpublished catenae might add to this list. Further investigation in the East would undoubtedly bring to light fresh material, if not actually new

²⁵ Karekin, pp. ԷԴ, 286. A colophon in a manuscript described in Erevak, IV, pp. 40-47 (cf. Dashian, Catalogue, p. 2), attributes the Armenian version of this piece to the middle of the fifth century. With the exception of Athos, Vatopedi 6, the Vita Antonii does not figure in the Greek corpora; see K. Lake, *Journal of Theological Studies*, V, p. 112, note 1.

²⁶ J. Lebon, 'Les citations patristiques grecques du Sceau de la foi,' *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, XXV, 1929, pp. 8-9. There are several quotations of doubtful origin and the spurious De sancta trinitate dialogus IV (P. G. xxviii, 1249 ff.) is attributed to Basil of Caesarea. This evidence should, however, be used with some caution, for, so far as I am aware, no thorough investigation has been made of the sources of this catena. Some of its quotations may have been rendered directly from the Greek or derived from Greek catenae.

²⁷ *Դիւք Թղթոյ*, Tiflis, 1901.

texts, but manuscripts of the Armenian corpora are evidently rare.²⁸

²⁸ I have found none in other catalogues of European libraries, and neither Fr. Akinian, who has examined a large part of the collection at Etschmiadzin, nor Professor R. P. Blake, who had the kindness to look at Jerusalem and on Mt. Sinai for me, could report others. The following Athanasiana in Armenian manuscripts at the Bibliothèque Nationale deserve special mention: *De incarnatione dei verbi* (P. G. xxviii, 25-29; Tajezi, pp. 281-283), B. N., Cod. Arm. 201 (paper, notragir, 17th-18th century), ff. 79a-80a; Cod. Arm. 311 (paper, notragir, 17th-18th century). *Ad Jovianum de fide* (P. G. xxviii, 531; Tajezi, p. 344), B. N., Cod. Arm. 201, ff. 80a-80b; Cod. Arm. 311, ff. 154b-155a. (It is notable that *De incarnatione dei verbi* is followed by the Letter to Jovian in Codd. Vind. 629 and 648 and in Karekin's colophon, but not in the Greek manuscripts.) *De sancta trinitate* (Tajezi, pp. 239-242), B. N., Cod. Arm. 110 (paper, erkathagir, 12th century), f. 4a 1. *Vita Antonii* (P. G. xxvi, 835-976; Tajezi, pp. 533-614), B. N., Cod. Arm. 110, ff. 106a 2-112a 2; Cod. Arm. 115 (paper, bolorgir, 13th-14th century), ff. 2b-6b. (In many Armenian as well as in Syriac manuscripts this last piece is abbreviated. A study of the Armenian corresponding to F. Schultess' study of the Syriac [*Probe einer syrischen Version der Vita S. Antonii*, Leipzig, 1894] is needed.) *Epistula ad Justinum Africae* (Tajezi, pp. 345-346), B. N., Cod. Arm. 110, ff. 184b 2-185a 1. (Two of Tajezi's manuscripts describe this as a letter to Augustine of Africa, one to Justin. The Paris codex reads simply: Թուղթ Աթանասի.) *De spiritu sancto* (Inc. բայց մեք ոչ եթէ զհոգի աշխարհի առաք, այլ զհոգին որ յԱյ.) : B. N., Cod. Arm. 116 I (paper, holorgir, 14th century), f. 326. (Maccler has failed to notice that this treatise does not run to the end of the volume, but ends on f. 330a 3 and is followed by another work on a similar theme by Gregory the Illuminator: Սրբոյ Գրիգորի հայոց Լուսաւորչի վասն դալստեան հոգւոյն սրբոյ. Inc. ակն արկեալ մեզ այսուհետեւ, etc.).

NOTES

Gothenburg Papyrus 21 and the Coptic Version of the Letter to Abgar

IN THE last number of the Harvard Theological Review I gave what I believe to be a definitive identification of the Gothenburg Papyrus 21. By way of demonstration I reproduced the text of the papyrus as reported by Frisk,¹ with textual corrections and illustrative restorations of my own.² I appended to the text a discussion in which I sought to establish its relations to other Greek versions of the Letter to Abgar. In my desire to bring to the attention of scholars a new Greek version of the Letter, the text of which presents remarkable departures from the traditional Eusebian version, my examination was restricted to the better known Greek sources. A subsequent examination of four additional Greek specimens of the Letter and of all the copies of the Coptic version, while necessitating no essential modification of my conclusions, has revealed in the Gothenburg papyrus important textual filiations which I did not then suspect.

The copy of the Letter to Abgar inscribed on the lintel of a door at Ephesus, found by Austrian excavators in 1899,³ belongs to the group presenting the Eusebian text and its derivatives, and need not detain us. The inscription found at Gurdja in the same year by J. G. C. Anderson⁴ and the Bodleian papyrus published by W. H. Lindsay⁵ and identified by Edward B. Nicholson⁶ belong to the same group, but support the Gothenburg papyrus and *Epistula Abgari* in reading *ἐπίστευσας* for the otherwise universal *πιστεύσας*.⁷ The copies

¹ Hjalmar Frisk, *Papyrus grecs de la Bibliothèque Municipale de Gothembourg*, Göteborg, 1929, p. 42. See also *Gnomon*, November 1930, p. 611.

² In the course of experimenting with l. 4 of the text, I allowed a grammatical inconsistency to escape my attention. The masculine participle *διανύζων*, both there and in the subsequent discussion, should be corrected to the corresponding neuter *διανύζον*.

³ R. Heberdey, *Jahreshefte des österreichischen archäologischen Institutes in Wien*, III, 1900, Beiblatt 2, cols. 90 ff.

⁴ *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XX, 1900, p. 157.

⁵ *Athenaeum*, Sept. 5, 1885, p. 304.

⁶ *Athenaeum*, Oct. 17, 1885, p. 506.

⁷ See *Harvard Theological Review*, October 1930, p. 300.

of the Coptic version ⁸ exhibit almost without exception (other than orthographic) the reading 'ἀκπιστευε,' ⁹ an exact replica of ἐπιστευσας.

In the tenth century Chronicle of Georgios Hamartolos ¹⁰ is a version of the Letter substantially the same as that of Eusebius ¹¹ and hence radically at variance with the text of the Gothenburg papyrus. Nevertheless it alone of the Greek texts now known to me follows the papyrus in omitting the pseudo-biblical citation introduced in the orthodox manner by γέγραπται γάρ and giving expression to the great paradox of faith as a state of conviction independent of material evidence.¹² Epistula Abgari, to which the papyrus is closely related, has this sentence, as does Eusebius. And here again the Coptic lends entire confirmation to the papyrus.¹³ The Greek original from which the Coptic version was made cannot have had the sentence, and to this extent it is represented for us in the Gothenburg text. And since a sentence of this nature can only be an interpolation, a version free from it has every chance of being closer to the original than one of which it has become an integral part.

I have already observed the interesting fact that the Gothenburg papyrus, despite its own brevity, reveals closer affinities of thought and language to the long text of Epistula Abgari than to the short text preserved by Eusebius.¹⁴ Indeed, it presents points of contact with all the Greek versions but is not completely identifiable with any one of them — a situation analogous to that observed by Drioton as existing between the hypothetical Greek original of the longer Coptic version of the Letter of Abgar to Christ and the known Greek versions.¹⁵ In several respects the text of the Gothenburg papyrus is not to be paralleled in any other Greek version.

⁸ E. Drioton, *Revue de l'Orient Chrétien*, 2d series, X (XX), pp. 307 ff. (On p. 308 'Regn. 55' should be 'Regn. 65.' The final paragraph on p. 309 might prove misleading: 'la lettre de Notre-Seigneur à Abgar' should be 'la lettre d'Abgar à Notre-Seigneur.') An independent examination of the Coptic texts has shown me that Drioton was justified in speaking of the "unique version" of the Coptic Letter to Abgar. The relations of the Greek versions are more complex. However, a recent addition on the Coptic side has brought us a shorter text which ought to prove important for a closer estimate of the value of P Got 21.

⁹ Drioton, p. 319.

¹⁰ Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, CX, 381.

¹¹ Schwartz-Mommsen, *Eusebius Werke*, II, 1, p. 88. The text with French translation is given by Drioton, pp. 306 f.

¹² Eusebius: γέγραπται γάρ περὶ ἐμοῦ τοὺς ἑσρακώτας με μὴ πιστεύσειν ἐν ἐμοί, καὶ ἵνα οὐ μὴ ἑσρακώτες με ἀπὸ πιστεύωσι καὶ ζήσουσιν.

¹³ Drioton, p. 319.

¹⁴ This was the burden of my note in *Harvard Theological Review*, October 1930.

¹⁵ Drioton, p. 340.

Now if we turn to the Coptic version, we find that at no point does P Got lack its support. To be sure, the latter has not the extent of the Coptic text, but the elements and their disposition are alike in both. The correspondence has been partially noted in the preceding paragraphs. The following columns present the passages which the papyrus has in common with the Coptic version only. The mode of transliteration is that employed by W. E. Crum in his *Coptic Ostraca* (London, 1902), and the translations have been made as literal as possible to facilitate comparison, without violence to intelligibility.

P GOT 21	COPTIC VERSION	TRANSLATION OF COPTIC VERSION
1 μακάριος εἶς, καλῶς σοι ἔσται καὶ μακα- ρία ἡ πόλις σου	naiatk auð ppetnanouf našôpe mmok auð naiats ntekpolis	Blessed art thou and good will be to thee and blessed is thy city.
I have given all that remains of the sentence in P Got 21. The clause καλῶς σοι ἔσται responds to ppetnanouf našôpe mmok and is not known elsewhere. The reading μακάριος εἶς is that reported by Frisk; the Coptic suggests that reëxamination may reveal μακάριος εἷ κ(αί).		
2 μακάριος σὺ κ(αί) ὁ λαὸς σου ἔσται εἰς τ[ὸν αἰῶνα	nekšône senatalgôou auð ešje-aker hah mnobe hws rôme senakaau nak ebol. auð etessa našôpe essma- maat šaeneh	Thine illnesses shall be healed and if thou hast multiplied sins, as a man, they will be forgiven to thee. And Edessa will be blessed forever.

The short phrase μακάριος σὺ cannot be other than a résumé of nekšône . . . ebol.

3 ἐξανατείλῃ δὲ ἐν αὐ- τῇ διανγαζ[<i>lacuna</i> of uncertain length] ης	auð tπιστις mnταγαπη naerouoein hnnesπλατια	And faith and charity will be radiant in her streets.
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In my former article I proposed the reading ἐξανατείλῃ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ διανγαζ[ον τὸ φῶς τῆς γ]ῆς, but the Coptic deprives it of probability. No doubt, however, can remain that ἐξανατείλῃ is really a futuristic subjunctive and διανγαζ[the remnant of a present participle of διανγάζω.

4 ἐγὼ ἐντέλλ[ομαι <i>la-</i> <i>cuna</i> of uncertain length] ου διὰ μάρ- τυαμ	anok ethôn auð anok etšaje . . . tinakô mpek- ran euerpmeeue . . .	(It is) I who command and I who speak . . . I shall place thy name in memory.
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Frisk suggests διὰ μάρτυρα, which is certainly closer to the original than the correction that I proposed on the basis of a comparison with Epistula Abgari. It is further likely that part of the lacuna was occupied by τὸ ὄνομά σ]ου.

The case for an intimate connection between P Got 21 and the Coptic version is further strengthened by the fact that in those passages which are common only to the papyrus, the Coptic version, and Epistula Abgari, the correspondence is closer between the first two. For convenience' sake I again resort to a table.

P GOT 21	COPTIC VERSION	TRANSLATION OF COPTIC VERSION	EPISTULA ABGARI
1 ἐγὼ Ἰ(ησοῦ)ς χειρεῖ τῇ ἐμῇ ἐγραψα	anok I(ησου)s pen- taishai nteieπιστο- λη hn tagij mmine mmoi	(It is) I, Jesus, who have written this letter with my own hand.	ὁ λόγος γραπτὸς ἔγραπται τῇ ιδίᾳ μου χειρὶ

The evidence, I admit, is here divided. While the Gothenburg papyrus and the Coptic version agree in the construction (ἐγραψα, aishai), the use of the emphatic pronoun (ἐγὼ, anok), and the introduction of the signature (Ἰησοῦς), Epistula Abgari responds to ἐπιστολῇ with ὁ λόγος γραπτὸς and to hn tagij mmine mmoi with τῇ ιδίᾳ μου χειρὶ, of which the intensive force is also in the Coptic. This division of verbal evidence, however, must not be allowed to obscure the primary fact that the style of the papyrus and of the version is the same in directness and simplicity, while that of Epistula Abgari aims at literary effect.

2 κ(αὶ) ὅπου δ' ἂν προβληθῇ τα. [lacuna of un- certain length] κειμένο[pma etounatōje ebol nhēf ntigij nshai nnelaau nδη- ναμς nteπαντικι- μενος, etc.	the place in which will be exposed my letter (lit. manu- script), no Power of the Adversary will be, etc.	αὕτη δέ μου ἐπι- στολή, ὅπου ἂν προβληθῇ εἴτε ἐν δίκῃ ἢ ἐν δικαστη- ρίῳ, εἴτε ἐν ὁδῷ, εἴτε ἐν θαλάσῃ, εἴτε ἐν ῥιγῶσιν, κ.τ.λ.
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If the lacuna is ever to be dealt with successfully, the restoration must follow the Coptic. I previously proposed on the basis of the construction in Epistula Abgari the following partial restoration: κ(αὶ) ὅπου δ' ἂν προβληθῇ μου τὰ γράμματα εἴτε ἐν ?]κειμένο[is. The Coptic suggests that if the papyrus be reexamined the doubtful letter may prove to be really γ and the reading consequently γ[ράμματα. I retract εἴτε ἐν since]κειμένο[is certainly τοῦ ἀντι]κειμένο[ν. It would be

folly to think otherwise in view of the occurrence of *παντικιμενος* in a suitable position in the Coptic text.

In fact, I have to withdraw all but the most obvious of the restorations which I projected in the former article. The close correspondence of P Got 21 with the Coptic in all that actually remains of the text destroys the plausibility of my restorations, based as they were largely on *Epistula Abgari* or, where this was not available, on conjecture supported by an erroneous notion of the original length of the lines. Since the importance of the text can be established in spite of the lacunae, I will refrain from further conjectures in that direction.

I cannot here enter fully into the difficult problem of origin raised by differences in length of text. The Coptic version may be the expansion of a brief text translated from such a text as P Got 21. On the other hand, the Coptic version may itself be the translation of a long text, of which P Got 21 is a condensation. The desire to employ a text as amulet would normally favor condensation. And a recent addition to the Coptic texts¹⁶ supports the latter hypothesis. It is an example of the short text of the Letter to Abgar such as was unknown at the time when Drioton collated the texts of the "unique version" of the Letter.¹⁷ While it is almost an exact replica of the Gothenburg papyrus, it appears to omit an element present in the longer Coptic version and in P Got 21 (*ἐπίστευσας*), and also has an element present in the former and presumably lacking in the latter (nte peouu mpnoute ašai hm pesλαος, the glory of God will grow in her people). It exhibits the reading hnnεsπλaтia, 'in her streets,' as does the long Coptic version, where P Got has simply *ἐν αὐτῇ*. The short Coptic text is then a condensation of the usual Coptic version, and not a translation of P Got 21. Consequently there is nothing at present to indicate descent of the Coptic version from the Gothenburg papyrus. The latter is in all likelihood an abbreviated version of a longer text, of which the longer Coptic version is a translation. Until that text comes to light, P Got 21 remains the closest known point of contact between the Greek and the Coptic traditions.

¹⁶ W. E. Crum and H. G. Evelyn White, *Monastery of Epiphanius at Thebes*, New York, 1926, p. 11.

¹⁷ Drioton, pp. 318 ff.

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ERRATA IN THE HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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IN connection with the article by Robert P. Casey, entitled 'Armenian Manuscripts of St. Athanasius of Alexandria,' in the last number of this REVIEW, pages 43-59, a misunderstanding took place at the Press which caused a number of the Armenian words to be printed in uncorrected form. It is therefore necessary to supply the following regrettable list of corrections:

- Page 44.37 *read* Gir *for* gir
 45.1 ǝnddimamartiç *for* yandimamartiç
 45.7 srbov *for* surbov
 45.9 vasn *for* vs.
 45.20 yaruçeloç *for* yaruçeloy
 45.20 srboy *for* siroy
 45.26 Episkopos *for* Ep.
 45.31 Libēos *for* Lit'ēos
 46.8 Errordut'eann *for* Errordut'ean
 46.34 žolovn *for* žolov
 46.35 Ariosi *for* Ariosn
 47.9 Noçunç *for* noçunç
 47.21 mkrtaçeloç astuacavayeluç vardapetut'eann
 47.24 om. ŽA *and read* Inc.
 47.25 jezs *for* jeis
 47.26 om. ČA *and read* Des.
 47.27 ařak'inakan *for* ař abinakan
 48.12 hrařaparn *for* erařaparn
 48.14 xap'aneaç *for* xap'ançeal
 48.33 Artadrut'iwn *for* artagrut'iwn
 49.6 Samostaçwoy
 49.12 Yaytnut'eann *for* Yaytnut'ean
 52.11 Errordut'iwn *for* Errordut'ean
 52.11 marmnaworut'iwn *for* marmnaworut'ean
 52.14 Epiktemon *for* Ipiiktemon
 52.18 Libēos *for* Lit'ios
 53.3 eawt'newtasn *for* Eawt'newtasn
 53.18 Awart *for* Awart
 54, note 22 and 58.20 Knik' Hawatoy *for* kink' hawatoy

